KUMARATTA SERVAIGARAN ALIAS CHINNASAMI SERVAIGARAN, MINOR, BY HIS ADOPTIVE MOTHER AND GUARDIAN SEERAI AMMAL Vs. PLSARSABAPATHY CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant was a party defendant in a suit in which a mortgage decree was passed ordering the sale of specified mortgaged property. On an application to make the decree absolute and for an order for the sale of the property, the appellant seeks to stop the sale, contending that the decree which has been passed against him is not binding on the property on the ground that he has been adopted into the family of another person to whom the property belongs. The. Subordinate Judge overruled this objection and made the order asked for. We think he was clearly right. The objection taken by the appellant is that though the decree to which he is a party is a decree for sale of specified immoveable property, he is entitled to object, in execution, to the sale of the property. In other words, the objection is an objection to the decree itself, and not to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Unless the objection relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, it is not within Section 244(a) Civil Procedure Code, and we think this case is not within it. This is the view adopted in Sanwal Das V/s. Bismillah Begam (1897) I.L.R. 19 A. 480, Liladhar v. Chaturbhuj (1899) I.L.R. 21 A. 277, Akikunnissa Bibee V/s. Roop Lal Das (1898) I.LR. 25 C. 807, Khetrapal Singh Roy V/s. Shyama Prosad Barman (1904) I.L.R. 32 C. 265.

(2.) In the case cited in opposition, Kuriyoli V/s. Mayan (1883) I.L.R. 7 M. 255, the present question was not raised or, apparently, considered, and we do not think that it intends to lay down the proposition that it is open to a party to the suit to question the decree in execution.

(3.) We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. See also Dinonath V/s. Shama (1900) I.L.R. 28 C. 23 : But vide Chancier V/s. Sham (1905) I.L.R. 33 C. 676 - ED.