RANI CHANDAN Vs. RANI BHAGOTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this case the plaintiff, the younger widow of one Dhiraj Singh, who died on the 10th December 1875, brought her suit to recover half of the property which had been left by Dhiraj Singh. The defendant was the elder widow of the deceased. The property which was claimed in the suit consisted of 24 villages which are specified in the schedule to the plaint. The defendant pleaded, first, that the matters between the parties had been referred to arbitration by an agreement in writing, and that there was an award of the arbitrators which decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover half of the property. She further pleaded that the plaintiff was unchaste before the death of her husband, and that therefore she would not be entitled to inherit the share of the property which was claimed.

(2.) IN the first Court, the Deputy Commissioner of Narsinghpur, who tried the case, framed several issues, two being whether the question of the distribution of the property of Dhiraj Singh had been referred to arbitration by agreement between the parties in writing, and an award thereon been made, and whether the agreement was binding. Probably it was meant to include in this issue the question whether the award, as well as the agreement, was binding. Another issue was, whether the plaintiff was unchaste before the death of her husband, and so debarred from inheriting. In his judgment he said it was doubtful, he thought, whether the plaintiff did sign the submission to arbitration; but he did not consider that even if she did it was binding, and he gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the half share of the villages claimed.

(3.) THEN the case went by way of what was formerly called a special appeal, but which is now called a second appeal, to the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces. The Judicial Commissioner, on that second appeal, had no jurisdiction to deal with any findings of fact. The facts as found by the lower Appellate Court would have to be taken as being the real facts of the case. However, he did deal with the question whether the agreement was signed and made by the plaintiff, and he considered that the lower Appellate Court was fully justified in that finding. But he appears to have thought that he could go into the whole case, because he says: " I have two questions, to decide: first, whether the lower Appellate Court had evidence for the finding that the agreement was genuine; secondly, whether it was right in upholding the award." After finding that the agreement was signed, he went into the question whether the award was to be upheld, and decided "that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority in entering into the question of the plaintiff's chastity, and that the award was bad: and on that ground he reversed the decision of the Additional Commissioner.