RANEE KHAJOOROONISSA Vs. RANEE RYEESOONISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE cross appeals arise in a suit brought by the Ranee Ryeesoonissa against the Ranee Khajooroonissa, the Defendant being the representative of the estate of Rajah Enajet Hossein. The suit was brought to recover the sum of a lac of rupees in respect of dower, less certain payments which had been made in the lifetime of the rajah, and which reduced the total claim under the contract of dower to Rs. 91,875. The two ranees were the widows of the rajah. The Plaintiff Ryeesoonissa was the elder wife; and it appeared that she had separated from her husband several years before his death, and before his marriage with the Ranee Khajooroonissa. The claim for dower is divided into two parts. By the kabeennamah, under which the dower was agreed to be paid, one-fourth was declared to be prompt, and the remaining three-fourths deferred dower. The Principal Sudder Ameen gave judgment for the Plaintiff for the full amount of her claim, that is, both for the prompt and for the deferred dower. On appeal the High Court affirmed so much of the judgment of the Principal Sudder Ameen as related to the deferred dower, but reversed it as to the prompt or exigible dower; being of opinion that there had been a demand of that dower in the lifetime of the rajah, and a refusal of it, and that the claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Both the ranees appealed from that decision. The Ranee Khajooroonissa appealed upon the ground that the kabeennamah itself, which was the foundation of the ranee Plaintiff's claim, was not a genuine document, and also upon the ground that the deferred dower was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The ground upon which the deferred dower was alleged to be barred was that there had been a divorce between the parties, and that the deferred dower then became payable. It was also said that the rajah had made an aila or vow that he would have no further intercourse with his wife, and that that also made the dower payable at a period which would render the Statute of Limitations a bar.

(2.) ON the opening of the appeal for the Ranee Khajooroonissa by Mr. Leith, it clearly appeared that the facts entirely failed the Appellant, and that no question really arose for their Lordships' decision. The genuineness of the deed was entirely a question of fact, which had been decided by both the Courts below in favour of the ranee the Plaintiff. With regard to the divorce and the aila, these also were questions of fact which had, in the manner, been decided against the ranee Defendant. Her appeal therefore must be dismissed, and dismissed with costs.

(3.) IT is not necessary to decide whether the limitation to be applied is that in the 9th clause of the 1st section of the Act XIV. of 1859, or that in the 16th, because whether the term be the three years mentioned in the one, or the six years mentioned in the other, the interval between the alleged breach or cause of action and the commencement of the suit has been longer than either. For the present purpose, the terms used in the two sections, although differing in language, are the same in substance. The limitation in one runs from the breach of the contract, in the other from the cause of action. If there had been a breach, there would be a cause of action; therefore the terms may be regarded as identical so far as the decision of the present appeal is concerned.