(1.) This application is against the order of the Additional Election Commissioner of Gaya by which he set aside the election of the petitioner to the District Board, Gaya, and declared the opposite party as duly elected in his place. The first point that has been raised is that the opposite party who was declared duly elected was not eligible for election at all. In support of this contention Mr. Raj-kishore Prasad referred to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4, Bihar District Board Electoral Rules, 1937. That sub-rule provides: No person shall be entitled to have his name registered on the electoral roll of more than one electoral circle in the same district.
(2.) It is an admitted fact that the name of the opposite party Jadunandan Mahto was borne on the electoral roll of Jahanabad circle as well as that of Kurtha circle. Mr. Rajkrishore Prasad contended that as the rule definitely forbids that the name of a candidate should be on the electoral rolls of two different circles he was ineligible for election. There is, however, nothing in the rules to support the contention. The learned Additional Election Commissioner has carefully dealt with this question in his judgment on issue 5. He referred to Rule 30 which specifies the grounds on which the nomination of a candidate is to be rejected. The fact that the name of a candidate is borne on the two electoral rolls in the same district is not one of the grounds on which the nomination of a candidate is to be rejected. That being so, it cannot reasonably be argued that the opposite party Jadunandan Mahto was not a qualified voter and therefore not a qualified candidate for election. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that Sub-rule (3) of Rule 30 clearly provides that the decision of the Returning Officer shall be final. That decision, even if erroneous, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction merely on the ground that the decision was wrong. The learned Additional Election Commissioner has also referred to certain reported decisions in connexion with the election disputes relating to Legislative Council. The cases referred to by him are very nearly similar. In those cases too the name of the candidate was borne on two electoral rolls within the same constituency. In those cases it was held that that did hot disqualify a candidate. For these reasons, in my opinion, there is no substance in this contention. The second point that has been urged is that the learned Additional Election Commissioner was not justified in declaring the opposite party as duly elected without coming to a definite decision as to the opposite party having secured majority of valid votes. The relevant rule on the point is Rule 6, District Board Election Petitions Rules, 1939. That rule provides: The petitioner may, if he so desires, in addition to calling in question the election of a returned candidate, claim a declaration that he himself or any other oandidate has been duly elected; but such a declaration shall only be claimed on one or other of the following grounds namely, (a) that the petitioner or such other candidate in fact received a majority of valid votes; or (b) that, but for the votes obtained for the returned candidate by corrupt praotices, the petitioner orsuch other candidate would have obtained a majority of valid votes; or
(3.) This case clearly does not fall under Clause (a) for in fact the opposite party did not receive majority of the valid votes. Therefore Clause (b) governs the case. The learned Additional Election Commissioner who heard the evidence after carefully considering all the circumstances came to the conclusion that but for the corrupt practices by the petitioner the opposite party would have obtained majority of the valid votes. Mr. Rajkishore Prasad contends that the Election Commissioner has not specifically stated in his order the grounds on which his opinion is based. According to my reading of the order he has given his reasons and pointed out the circumstances in consideration of which he came to that conclusion. It was not possible for any tribunal to arrive at a definite conclusion in the way of counting votes. The decision on the point could only be arrived at on a general consideration of all the circumstances. The learned Election Commissioner has pointed out in his judgment that no female voter of Koeri, Goala or other castes who do not observe purdah came forward to vote. He attributed this to violence that took place which, according to him, was at the instance of the petitioner. He has given other reasons in support of his conclusion and it is not necessary to refer to them in detail. I can see no ground to justify any interference with the finding of the Election Commissioner on the point.