SRIMATH THIRUMALA VENKATA SHRINIVASA CHARYULU AYYAVARLAM GARU Vs. SRIMATH KIDAMBI SRINIVASA VENKATAVARADACHARYULU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The execution petition out of which this appeal arises was in execution of a final mortgage decree of 16 June 1942 in O.S. No. 15 of 1939. One of the items mortgaged, namely, item 4, was purchased by defendant 2 in execution of a money decree against the mortgagor; and, on 27 December 1942, the respondent acquired the rights of defendant 2 in this property. On 19 March 1913, by Ex. P-1, the respondent obtained an assignment of the mortgage decree in O.S. No. 15 of 1939. He now seeks to execute the decree in Order Section No. is of 1939; and some of the defendants opposed the execution of the decree on the ground that since the respondent had acquired the rights of the mortgagor in a part of the property and had become a transferee-decree-holder, he was not entitled to execute the decree at all; and even if he were, he would be entitled to execute it only for the decree amount minus the proportionate burden of the decree resting upon item 4. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled the objection and ordered the decree to be executed for the full decree amount. He held that the equities in favour of the appellants could be considered only in a suit by them for contribution. In appeal, the appellants have not argued the extreme case which they adopted in the lower Court of contending that the decree could not be executed at all. They content themselves here with arguing that the decree can be executed only for the proportionate share of the decree amount. The question whether the objections of the appellants are tenable or not depends upon whether, in the words of Section 47, Civil P.C., these matters relate to the "execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree." If they do, then the Court is bound to consider the questions raised by the appellants; if not then the Court is precluded from going into those questions; and the parties must have their equities adjusted in a separate suit. It is argued that the question raised relates to the discharge of the decree; it is said that upon the respondent's acquiring an interest in item 4 of the property and then obtaining an assignment of the decree, there was a pro tanto and automatic discharge of the decree. Even if there had been no decree and we were considering a claim by a mortgagee who had acquired the interests of a mortgagor, it would be difficult to see how there could have1 been an automatic discharge of the mortgage amount. A mortgagor could resist a claim by the mortgagee for the full amount only by applying Section 60, Transfer of Property Act, which enunciates the principle that the mortgagor cannot redeem the mortgage only in part, according to his share, except in cases where the mortgagee has acquired the interests of a mortgagor. The last paragraph of Section 60 says: Nothing in this section shall entitle a person interested in a share only of the mortgaged property to redeem his own share only, on payment of a proportionate part of the amount remaining due on the mortgage, except only where a mortgagee, or, if there are more mortgagees than one, all such mortgagees, has or have acquired, in whole or in part, the share of the mortgagor.

(2.) In Shah Ram Chand. V/s. Parbhu Dayal ( 42) 29 A.I.R. 1942 P.C. 50 their Lordships of the Privy Council had to decide whether a mortgagee who had released some of the property could sue for the whole of the mortgage amount from the mortgagors owning the other property; and they had occasion in that connection to discuss in detatil the effect of of Section 60, Transfer of Property Act, and in particular the exception. They said: But the exception is made in the later case (the case of the mortgagee acquiring the interest of the mortgagor) not on the footing that it is unjust that the full burden of the security should be imposed on the other parts of the property; but because their claim to contribution has now become a claim against the mortgagee or his interest in the equity of redemption. Circuity of action is thought to be avoided if partial redemption be permitted.

(3.) It is thus seen that the reason why a mortgagee who acquires the interest of a. mortgagor cannot be given a decree for the full amount is that he has himself become owner of a part of the mortgaged property and so his share of the mortgage burden can be set off even in the mortgage suit against the claim on the mortgage. There is in such a case no fiction of a pro tanto discharge of the mortgage amount, except in a very loose sense of that expression. When we come to consider the case with which we have to deal in this appeal, namely, where a decree has been passed, it is still more difficult to see how by the acquiring of the decree the decree can be said to have been automatically discharged in part. It seems to us that a decree can only be discharged either by a payment of the whole or part of the decree amount or by agreement between the parties. There is some authority for the appellants contention, however, in Sarju Kumar V/s. Thakur Prasad ( 20) 7 A.I.R. 1920 All. 129. The decision in that case was based on a decision of Mahmood J. in Kudhai V/s. Sheo Dayal ( 88) 10 All. 570 where the learned Judge said: When subsequent to a decree a portion of the rights to which the decree relates devolves either by inheritance or otherwise upon the judgment-debtor, or is acquired by him under a valid transfer, the decree does not become incapable of execution, but is extinguished only pro tanto.