JONNADA SAYI Vs. JONNADA SUBBANNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The suit was brought by the plaintiffs to recover possession of certain properties described as washerman service inam lands on the allegation that they belonged to the first plaintiff and were given on lease to the second plaintiff under Ex. P-I on the 10 March, 1941 and that the defendants trespassed into the lands on 29 April, 1941. Certain very material facts which have been found to be true were suppressed by the plaintiffs. The first plaintiff had put the defendants in posession of the properties under arrangement evidenced by a letter marked ? as Ex. D-I, dated 3 January, 1932. Under this arrangement they were to have possession of the lands belonging to her, rendering village service as per mamool and giving her a half share in the produce. In case, the lands were given on lease they were to give her a half share of the rent received. The arrangement was to enure for her life and possession was delivered to the defendants under the arrangement. The second plaintiff took a lease of the lands from the defendants and the first plaintiff on 8 June, 1937, for a period of four years under Ex. D-2. The lease expired on 27 March, 1941. It was after this that the first plaintiff is said to have granted a lease in favour of the second plaintiff under Ex. P-1 on 10 March, 1941.

(2.) Both the lower Courts which dismissed the plaintiffs suit have found that the defendants were not trespassers and that the lease which the first plaintiff granted in favour of the second plaintiff could not prevail against their rights under Ex. D-I. They have held that even though Ex. D-I is unregistered, the doctrine of part performance enunciated in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act applied to the case.

(3.) Two points have been argued on behalf of the appellants. One is that the defendants must be treated as trespassers because the lease under Ex. D-2 expired on 27 March, 1941 and the second plaintiff got a lease in his favour from the first plaintiff on 10 March, 1941. This argument overlooks the fact that the arrangement under Ex. D-I was not terminated and could not be because, as stated already, it is to enure during the period of the first plaintiff's life. So the possession which the defendants have is referable to Ex. D-I, not having anything, to do with any trespass into the property on 29 April 1941 or on any other date. It is true that the first plaintiff expressed her intention to throw the arrangement evidenced by Ex. D-I overboard by granting a lease in favour of the second plaintiff, but this surely does not bind the defendants who have got rights under Ex. D-I.