SHEONANDAN PANDEY Vs. MTASARFI KUER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a miscellaneous second appeal by the judgment-debtor. The decree under execution is a compromise decree for future maintenance under the terms of which the decree-holder was to get 25 maunds of rice every year from 1351 during POUS. For the first year, however, it was provided that the decree-holder would get seven maunds of rice on 20 June 1943, and the remaining 18 maunds in POUS. 1351. The judgment-debtor failed to give the seven maunds of rice by 20 June, and the decree-holder thereupon filed the present application for execution and realisation of the cash value of seven maunds of rice.

(2.) The judgment-debtor made an objection under Section 47, Civil P.C., and raised only one point, namely, that execution was premature as the decree-holder should have waited until POUS. This objection was rejected by the learned Munsif. In appeal this again was the only point taken before the learned Subordinate Judge, and he also rejected it. In second appeal, this point has not been pressed. Obviously it could not be pressed, since there was a clear default by the 20 June according to the terms of the decree and upon that default the decree-holder was entitled to execute her decree for the amount in default.

(3.) It has been attempted, however, to raise a new point in second appeal for the first time. The point is that execution is not maintainable, as upon the terms of the decree a fresh suit would be necessary and an application for execution would not lie. It has, however, been well settled for long that a decree for future maintenance is executable upon each default. I need only refer to the Full Bench case in Ashutosh Bannerjee V/s. Lukhimoni Debya (92) 19 Cal. 139, wherein it was laid down that future maintenance awarded by a decree when falling due can be recovered in execution of that decree without further suit. Their Lordships in that case quoted certain observations of Westropp C.J., who had said: It is not desirable that there should be several suits in respect of the maintenance of one widow. The system of seeking or granting relief piecemeal, subjects both plaintiff and defendant to much unnecessary expense and trouble, and is only advantageous to the legal profession; such a course ought to be discontinued so far as may legitimately be done by the civil Court,- observations the force of which must appeal to every fair-minded person.