SUBBIAH READY Vs. T JARDON

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the Additional Judge of the Court of the Honourable the British Resident in Mysore, Bangalore, dated 14 August 1940, varying a judgment and decree of the District Judge, Bangalore, dated 20 November 1939. The claim of the plaintiff was for damages for injuries sustained by him in an accident to a motor car in which he was a passenger. He sued J.G. Anniah Reddy, defendant 1 and appellant 2 who was the driver of the car, and his father, J. Subbiah Reddy, defendant 2 and original appellant 1, who was the owner of the car. Subbiah died on 20 December 1940, and appellants (i) to (xvi) are his legal representatives.

(2.) The material facts are that in September 1937, the plaintiff, who was a motor engineer and salesman, was negotiating for a position in International Motors, Bangalore, a concern owned by defendant 2, in which defendant 1 was employed. In the morning of 27 September, whilst the draft of a proposed agreement between plaintiff and the firm was being typed, defendant 1 took the plaintiff out in a Skoda car in order to demonstrate the performance of the car. In the course of the drive, there was an accident due to the failure of defendant 1, who was driving, to notice an obstruction across the road in time to avoid it. The car overturned, and the plaintiff's left arm was severely injured, and eventually had to be amputated below the elbow. Both the lower Courts held that the accident was caused by the negligence of defendant 1, and in their Lordships' view this finding, which is one primarily of fact, is clearly right, and must be accepted, The trial Judge passed a decree against defendant 1 for Rs. 12,500 damages, but dismissed the suit against defendant 2. In appeal the Additional Judge increased the damages to Rs.25,000 and reversed the decree dismissing the suit against defendant 2. In the result be passed a decree against both defendants for Rs.35,000 and costs.

(3.) Their Lordships feel no doubt that the Additional Judge was right in holding defendant 2 liable. The car in which the accident occurred belonged to him, and was used in connexion with his business; it was being driven by his son, who was employed in the business; and the car was being demonstrated to one about to join the business, that is for the purposes of the business. It is clear therefore that defendant 1 was acting within the scope, or apparent scope, of his authority as a servant of defendant 2, and the latter is answerable for his tort. The only question which requires consideration on this appeal is that of damages, and this raises a question of same importance. The respondent had not appeared, but Mr. Quass for the appellants has argued that the Additional Judge had no right to interfere with the amount of damages found by the lower Court. He relies upon the rule acted upon by the Court of Appeal in England which was stated recently by Greet L.J., in (1985) 1 KB 354,1in these terms: "This Court will be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial Judge as to the amount of damages merely because they think that if they had tried the case in the first instance they would have given a lesser sum. In order to Justify reversing the trial Judge on the question of the amount of damages it will generally be necessary that this Court should be convinced either that the Judge acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it, in the judgment of this Court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled."