(1.) The suits giving rise to these two second appeals were filed under Section 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act to compel the defendants to issue pattas to the appellant who was the plaintiff in the trial Court. His suits were dismissed by both the lower Courts and hence the second appeals. The appellant's case is that Mahalinga Iyer who was the owner of a half share in the village of Kilayur leased certain lands to him and that he has been enjoying these lands as lessee for nearly 25 years before suit. He therefore acquired occupancy rights and as a ryot he filed the two suits under Section 55 of the Act to compel the landholder to issue a patta to him.
(2.) The defence is that the appellant was not a ryot of the lands involved in these two suits and that further they are the private lands of the respondent. On both the points, the lower Courts held against the appellant. These suits were tried along with three other suits which gave rise to second appeals Nos. 971, 974 and 977 of 1944 which we have disposed of today. Considerable confusion has arisen by the fact that all the suits were tried together. The appellant supported the case of the plaintiffs in the other suits and was examined as P.W. 2. In his evidence he merely referred to Exs. M to Y-1 and stated that Ex. M was a letter written to him by Mahalinga Ayyar in 1931, that Ex. N was a similar letter of 1932, that Ex. O series five in number were of 1933, Exs. P and P-1 were of 1934, Ex. Q and Q-1 of 1935, Ex.R to R-4 of the year 1936, S to S-5 of 1937, T and T-1 of 1938, U to U-2 of 1939 and W and W-1 of the year 1940. Ex. Y and Y-1 are the suit notices that were given by the appellant one to Lakshmana Iyer and the other to one Srinivasa Iyer. Beyond the reference to these documents in the way just set out, the appellant as P.W. 2 merely stated that he has been in enjoyment of the suit lands as a lessee for 25 or 26 years. The trouble is that a mere perusal of these documents do not show that they refer to the lands in Kilayur and much less to the lands involved in these two suits. The appellant was admittedly the lessee of Mahalinga Iyer of lands situated in other villages. Mahalinga Iyer apparently owned certain lands in Umayalpuram and in some other villages. The appellant was a lessee of Mahalinga Iyer's lands in other villages as well. In fact Ex. S-2 shows that in respect of Umayalpuram lands held under Mahalinga Iyer the appellant had to pay a rent of 60 kalams of paddy. The appellant and his advisers seem to have overlooked the necessity of connecting these documents with the lands in suit which are situated in Kilayur. The lower Courts were not satisfied that these letters really refer to suit lands. If that conclusion is accepted there is an end of the appellant's case.
(3.) There is some force in the argument of Mr. Swaminatha Iyer that these documents were assumed by both the parties to refer to the suit lands. We prefer to proceed on the footing that they refer to the suit lands and in the view that we take of the other question it is really unnecessary to decide whether these letters refer to the suit lands. We are in agreement with the finding of the lower Courts that these lands are really private lands as defined by Section 3 (10)(b)(iv) of the Madras Estates Land Act as amended by the later Acts. Under the Act as it stood in 1908, lands in which tenants did not get occupancy rights were dealt with in several sections and different tests were laid down in cases of different classes of estates. One class of estates under the Estates Land Act consists of whole mam villages which are not parts of zamindaries. Section 3(2)(d) defines such estates as any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof provided that the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the British Government, or any separated part of such village. Section 3(10) defined private land as meaning the domain or homefarm land of a landholder by whatever designation known such as kambhattam, khas, sir or pannai. Section 19 of the Act declared: Except as otherwise specially provided in this Act, the relations between a ryot and his tenants, or between a landholder and a tenant of his private land, and the rights of any other owners of land, are not regulated by the provisions of this Act. Section 6 which conferred occupancy rights was confined to the case of ryoti lands in an estate. Leaving out unnecessary words Section 6, Clause (1) says that every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitte.1 by a landholder to possession of ryoti land shall have a permanent right of occupancy and ryoti land was defined by Section 3 thus: Ryoti land means cultivable land in an estate other than private land. Therefore, if a certain land in an estate was private land, the person let into possession as a tenant of such land did not get occupancy rights. This provision is common to all the different classes of estates defined in Section 3(2). In respect of whole inam villages which were estates under Section 3(2)(d), the exception to Section 8 of the Act provided that where before or after the commencement of this Act the kudivaram interest in any land comprised in an estate falling under Section 3(2)(d) was acquired by the inamdar such land shall cease to be part of the estate. In the case of villages which were estates under Section 3(2)(d) if the inamdar acquired the kudivaram interest in some lands whether before or after the commencement of the Act, those lands were thereafter not parts of the estate though they may be situated geographically within the ambit of the village. As is well known the mere fact that a certain land is within the geographical limits of the estate does not mean that it is part of the estate. In such lands therefore, the tenant did not get occupancy rights. Chapter 12 of the Act dealt with the private lands of a landholder. Section 185 of the Act laid down certain rules of evidence to enable Courts to determine whether any land was the private land of the landholder. It enacted that in determining whether any land was the private land of the landholder regard should be had to the local custom and to the question whether the land was, before the first day of July 1898 specifically let as private land and to any other evidence that may be produced, but the land should be presumed not to be private land until the contrary was shown. A proviso was added that all land which was proved to have been cultivated as private land of the landholder himself by his own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stock for twelve years immediately before the commencement of this Act should be deemed to be the landholder's private land.