MUHAMMAD GOSUKANI Vs. MUHAMMAD SEKKA MARACAYAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from the decision of Curgenven, J. in Section A. No. 35 of 1929. The facts need not be stated again. The points taken on behalf of the appellants are four in number.

(2.) The first is based upon Section 6 Sub-section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act. By that it is provided that "a person holding land as an ijaradar or farmer of the rent shall not, while so holding, acquire otherwise than by inheritance or devise a right of occupancy in any land comprised in the ijara or farm". It is not disputed that when these holdings were brought to sale for arrears of rent the landholder was an ijaradar and that he bought them in for want of bidders. The argument, is that at such a sale of the holdings under the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act there is nothing for the land holder to purchase except the occupancy right of the tenant. Since Section 6 Sub-section 6 forbids an ijaradar to acquire a right of occupancy it is contended that the sales were void. We agree with Curgenven, J, that this argument is not well-founded. There is no doubt that an ijaradar is a land-holder for the purpose of the Madras Estates Land Act and Section 130 expressly provides that "a land- holder who has brought to sale a ryot's holding or part thereof for an arrear may bid for or I purchase the holding or a part thereof". We do nat accept the contention that Section 130 is a general provision to which Section 6 Sub-section 6 is an exception. We do not see any necessary conflict ft between these two provisions. It is quite true that under Section 6 Sub- section 6 an ijaradar cannot purchase a right of occupancy in any land comprised in his ijara. But the simple answer to this is that in the present case the ijaradar has never pretended to purchase the occupancy right. What he purchased is the holding which is the sum-total of the ryot's interests in the land. By Section 8(1) of the Act it is provided that when "the entire interests of the land-holder and the occupancy ryot in any land in the holding have become united by transfer, succession or otherwise in the same person, such person shall have no right to hold the land as a ryot, but shall hold it as a land-holder". This means that in such a case the land-holder does not own the occupancy right in the land but nevertheless when he lets the land again to a ryot that ryot acquires an occupancy right by operation of law. As Curgenven, J., has put it, when an ijaradar purchases the land as he might do under the provisions of Section 130, " wh|it happens is that the defaulting tenant loses his holding, in which he held an occupancy right, while the ijaradar acquires the holding but without acquiring the occupancy right ". We see no reason to differ from the view of the learned Judge on this point.

(3.) The second point is that a lessee cannot bring the holdings to sale after the expiry of his lease. This is concerned with items 1, 2 and 3 of the disputed lands. It is based upon the fact that the ijaradar held a lease for a single fasli (1320) and that the proceedings by which he purchased items 1, 2 and 3 in the sale were held after the expiry of fasli 1320. This point is sufficiently met in our opinion by the fact that the ijaradar continued to be a landholder after the close of fasli 1320 for a further period under another lease, the validity of which is not questioned. There is no doubt whatever, that at the time when the sales were held the ijaradar was a landholder within the meaning of the Act. And we are not prepared to hold that merely because the lease for the fasli in which the arrears accrued had expired he was therefore debarred from bringing the holdings to sale. On this point also we can find no reason to disagree with the decision of Curgenven, J.