LAWS(PVC)-1935-3-168

MUTYALA DORAYYA Vs. MARINA MANGAMMA

Decided On March 28, 1935
MUTYALA DORAYYA Appellant
V/S
MARINA MANGAMMA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiffs for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by the first defendant in favour of the defendants 3 to 6 on 12 February, 1925, will not be operative as against the plaintiffs after the death of the first defendant. The first defendant is a daughter of one Subbayya who had three sons, namely, the first plaintiff, the second defendant and the second plaintiff's father. It would appear that some time before 1900 there was a partition in the family, not evidenced by any document, and that at that time about 24 acres of land were allotted to the first defendant. The plaintiffs attempted to prove an express arrangement at the time that the first defendant was to take only a life interest in the property. The Courts below have refused to believe the oral evidence on this point and I see no reason to go behind their view in this matter. The plaintiffs also relied upon a document, Ex. A, of 1900 wherein it is provided that this lady should enjoy the property for her life and that thereafter it should be divided between the plaintiffs and the second defendant. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that it has not been proved that the first defendant was aware of the contents of Ex. A or that her mark was put to it with her consent. With this conclusion also I am not prepared to interfere. But the question still remains what, in the absence of any direct evidence one way or the other, is the quantum of interest that the first defendant must be taken to possess in these properties.

(2.) The learned Subordinate Judge starts the discussion of the question in paragraph 7 with a statement that the burden of proving that the properties were given to the first defendant only to be enjoyed for her life and not with absolute rights of disposition is upon the plaintiffs. I am not able to agree that that is the true position. I am inclined to think that there is no question of burden of proof in these matters and the Court has to determine the quantum of interest which the first defendant has, independently of any particular view of burden of proof. The learned Subordinate Judge next goes on to say "There is no presumption that properties given to a female are given only with limited rights and not with absolute rights." In a sense that statement is indisputable but the exceptions to it are so many that it is perhaps not safe to attempt to lay down any general rule one way or the other. Where the matter turns on the construction of a document, it is possible at this time of the day to say that Courts have leaned towards giving the widest interpretation to the words used, independently of the sex of the grantee. But the difficulty in this case is not merely that there is no document to be construed but that the circumstances are such that it would be scarcely correct to speak of any gift or disposition of property having been intended in favour of the first defendant.

(3.) The evidence shows that the first defendant became a widow even while she was aged about 11 and that ever thereafter she had been living with her father. If, in those circumstances, at a time when the father is dividing the family property between his sons, he allots certain property to the widowed daughter of his who has been living with him for several years and does not think it necessary to embody the arrangement in her favour in any document, it seems to me much more consistent with probabilities to assume that it was intended only as a provision for her maintenance. It is one thing to say that she is not legally entitled to maintenance though even on this point there are cases in this Court justifying an allotment of joint family property by a father in favour of his indigent daughter. But, apart from any legal liability, if the father and his sons agree to make an allotment to the daughter in circumstances of the kind above stated, I am unable to hold that it could have been intended to be an absolute gift in her favour. In Ramaswami V/s. Papayya (1893) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 466 : 3 M.L.J. 205 while recognising that there is no presumption that a gift in favour of a Hindu daughter must be taken to be only of a limited interest, the learned Judges laid stress on the fact that the daughter there was under coverture and not a widow. In this case the first defendant had become a widow quite early in life, she had no children and the gift of an absolute estate to her would merely mean that after her death the property will devolve upon her husband's reversioners. On the other hand, if all that was intended was that she should have the use of the property during her lifetime, it will remain in the family itself after her death. I am unable to ignore these considerations, merely out of regard for the theory that every gift must be presumed to be an absolute gift independently of the sex of the grantee.