DISTRICT BOARD Vs. LALA BEHARI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision by the District Board of Allahabad from a decree of the Court of Small Causes against a contractor who had brought a suit for refund of a deposit made by him as security, for the price of certain moram supplied and for payment for certain extra work done. The Court of Small Causes has given to the plaintiff a decree for the first two items but not for the third. The Board at the trial had conceded that it would refund the security money; nevertheless that point also is raised again in revision. The main question in the case is one of limitation as to whether the claim was governed by the six months rule as laid down in Section 192 of the District Boards Act, (Act 10 of 1922). There is no direct authority under this section, but there are several cases under Section 326, Municipalities Act (Act 2 of 1916), which has the same phraseology, and there are numerous cases under Section 80, Civil P.C., which has some similarity, and also one case under Section 273, Cantonments Act, which also has some analogy. So far as the corresponding section of the Municipalities Act is concerned, there are certainly at least two cases which can be said to support the applicant's view that the shorter period of limitation is applicable. There were several cases in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta which had suggested the contrary view of the corresponding sections in their local Acts. But in Abdul Wahid V/s. The Municipal Board 1923 21 ALJ 161 a suit had been brought for the return of security as well as for compensation for work done under certain contracts entered into with the Board. The Bench came to the conclusion that the refusal by the Board was on account of a certain resolution passed by the Board at its meeting and that was clearly an act done by the Board in its official capacity and therefore the refusal to pay the amount under that resolution necessitated the institution of a suit within six months from the date of such refusal.

(2.) A learned single Judge of this Court in Banwari Lal V/s. Municipal Board, Cawnpore 1925 23 ALJ 23 of course followed this decision in a case where the claim was brought by an employee of the Municipal Board for recovery of certain arrears of pay to which he had been entitled. The learned Judge held that subsequent demands made by the plaintiff and refusals by the Board did not give the plaintiff any fresh cause of action and that limitation began to run when the Board decided adversely to the plaintiff. These two cases no doubt can be cited in support of the view that the shorter period as prescribed by Section 192, District Boards Act, should be applied. In Jagannath Bhagwandas V/s. Municipal Board Allahabad 1928 25 ALJ 1038 a suit had been brought for the refund of certain duty paid on imported goods, which the plaintiff alleged was not payable. It was really not a suit brought on the basis of any private contract entered into between the plaintiff and the Municipal Board, but on the ground that the Board in disregard of its statutory duty to charge the proper amount had realised an excess amount and had declined to refund the excess. The case is therefore distinguishable from the case before us. In that case the learned Judges no doubt applied the provisions of Section 326, Municipalities Act, and held that the claim was governed by the six months rule.

(3.) Similarly in Munir Khan V/s. Municipal Board, Allahabad 1930 ALJ 461,S. 326 was applied to a suit which was brought by a conservancy contractor for remuneration for the work done in removing rubbish from certain parts and depositing the same in the trenching ground. The point that was argued at the Bar was that Section 326, Municipalities Act, was applicable to cases of tort only and not to cases of contract. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that the words "cause of action" were of sufficient amplitude to cover cases involving the infraction of an absolute right or of a right arising out of a contract and also of a right to compensation flowing from tort. It does not appear to have been argued before the Bench that even if the section applied to breaches of contract, the refusal to pay the amount due to the plaintiff was not "an act" within the meaning of that section. This aspect of the case was therefore neither pressed before nor considered by the Bench.