(1.) This Rule is directed against a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge of Howrah dated 31 July 1934 affirming the decision of Mr. B.K. Ghose, Magistrate of the first class, Howrah, dated 28 May 1934. The petitioner Kashiram Jhunjhunwalla was convicted by the learned Magistrate on charges laid under Section 408, I.P.C., and under Section 477-A of that Code and was sentenced under the latter section to one year's rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. The case for the prosecution was briefly as follows: Kashiram in his capacity as manager and cashier of the complainant firm Hurdut Rai Golap Rai had in his charge certain cheque books which had been signed by the complainant for the purpose of the withdrawal of money from the bank when necessary. Taking advantage of the fact that these cheque-books were in his possession the accused drew from the bank certain sums of money and misappropriated a part of those sums and then sought to cover up the defalcations by making entries on the counterfoils of the cheque books of amounts smaller than the sums for which the cheques were actually drawn and the monies received by him. The main charge against him was that he had misappropriated a total sum of Rs. 2,200 which was made up of seven separate items. He was also charged with falsification in respect of two entries in "the counterfoils and in his books of sums smaller that those actually drawn from the bank. He was in fact indicted on a charge of criminal breach of trust under Section 408, I.P.C., and on two separate charges of falsification of accounts under Section 477-A, I.P.C. At the trial the defence taken was a denial of the charges. The learned Sessions Judge says: The trial of the case appears to have a chequered career, and at one time certain questions were agitated in High Court.
(2.) He then said; In this Court of appeal there has been absolutely no argument on the merits of the case.
(3.) He gives certain reasons why that was so. The learned Sessions Judge continued: The whole argument by the learned advocate appearing for the appellant was restricted to three factors, namely (1) that the accused might now be given an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, (2) that an opportunity might be given to the appellant's lawyer to argue the case before the Magistrate, and (3) that the charges framed by the Court below were vitiated by several factors of illegality.