(VEDAVYASA) ALASINGA BHATTAR Vs. (VEDAVYASA) VENKATASUDARSANA BHATTAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) One Vedavyasa Bhattar was a Dharmakartha of the Srirangam temple and the right of his family to a place in the Dharmakarthaship is still reserved in the scheme framed by the High Court in Sitharama Chetty V/s. S. Subramanya Ayyar 1917 39 Mad 700 at p. 721. He had also certain mirasi offices in the temple with emoluments and perquisites attached to them. In 1870 the office of the Dharmakartha and certain mirasi offices were held by three descendants of the said Vedavyasa Bhattar, viz. (1) Sri Venkata Bhattar, (2) Venkatasudarsana Bhattar and (3) Thatha Bhattar, who then constituted an undivided Hindu family. Owing to dissensions in the family in 1870 they became divided in -status and later effected a partition of their properties including the mirasi offices in a certain manner. Ex. 3 dated 1 January 1876 which evidences the division provides, so far as the Dharmakarthaship is concerned, enjoyment by turns by the three members in rotation each for one year. The actual arrangement in the document was only for three years. But it is in evidence and not disputed that it was acted upon up to the date of the suit by the representatives of the various branches. In 1924 by a document, Ex. 5, dated 7 February 1924, and styled deed of partition, four members of the family, representatives of the three branches who were parties to the deed of 1876, purported to effect a complete partition of all that they had kept and enjoyed in common up to that date. They affirmed the arrangement of 1876 and stated that the properties were being enjoyed in accordance therewith up to that date. Thirumalai Bhattar, one of the parties to Ex. 5 died leaving no issue and defendant 1 became his heir, under the Hindu law in preference to the plaintiffs. It; may be mentioned that plaintiffs 1 and 2 and defendant 1 were parties to Ex, 5. The plaintiffs have now filed the suit out of which this second appeal arises praying for two reliefs : viz, (1) for "declaring that the plaint schedule offices, rights and perquisites lapse by survivorship to the plaintiffs and defendants 1 and 2 on the death of the said Vedavyasa Thirumalai Bhattar, on 12 November 1927; and as a consequential relief, (2) for directing (a) defendants 1 and 2 to enjoy the plaint schedule offices, rights and perquisites with the plaintiffs in equal moieties by turns or in any other manner the Court may deem fit to order, giving necessary directions therefor to defendants 1, 2 and 3."

(2.) Both the Courts have dismissed the suit holding that the arrangements entered into in 1876 and 1924 were binding on the parties in virtue of which defendant 1 is entitled to enjoy the share of Thirumalai Bhattar in preference to the plaintiff. Mr. Rajah Ayyar on their behalf has raised three contentions : One on a question of fact and two on questions of law, namely (1) the office of Dharmakarfchaship was in fact kept undivided and the plaintiffs have succeeded to the share of Thirumalai Bhattar by right of survivorship along with defendants 1 and 2; (2) the office of Dharmakarthaship and the mirasi offices are inalienable and impartible; (3) whatever may be said of religious offices, the office of Dharmakarthaship being in the nature of a bare trusteeship could not be the subject of a partition and every descendant succeeds to the trusteeship in his own right, not as a representative of another and any arrangement come to between the parties at one time could only bind them and not their successors.

(3.) The question of fact can be easily disposed of. The documents clearly indicate that the members of the family became divided in status and effected a complete division of all the properties including the office. In the document of 1876 no doubt provision was made only for three years in regard to the Dharmakarthaship, but it was illustrative of the future order in which the property was to be enjoyed by the several branches and for a period of nearly half a century it was so enjoyed. It must therefore be found that the office was divided and enjoyed by turns by the three branches in rotation in accordance with the arrangement of 1876. The office of a trustee of a temple or a religious office therein is prima facie inalienable. It is also indivisible. In one sense it is true that where the office is held by many, it is a collective office. I may state at the outset that it is neither sound nor proper to think of such offices from the point of view of a bare trustee under English law. The conception of the office of a trustee in English law is not the same as the Hindu conception. In Vidyavaruthi V/s. Baluswami Ayyar 1922 44 Mad 831, at pp. 839 and 840, speaking of a trustee of a temple, their Lordships of the Privy Council observe: It has also to be remembered that a trust in the sense in which; the expression is used in English law is unknown to the Hindu system, pure and simple; in no case is the property conveyed to or vested in him nor is he a trustee in the English sense of the term.