MINOR E R GURUNATHA CHETTIAR BY NEXT FRIEND ANGAMMAL Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF SALEM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Revision Petition raises a question of court-fee. The plaintiff-petitioner, who is a Mittadar, brought the suit for a declaration that in respect of certain lands in his mitta he is entitled to take water from the Cauvery free of irrigation cess and for a refund8 of a sum of Rs. 50 and odd which, according to him, had been illegally levied from him. The Court below has called upon the plaintiff to pay court-fee under Sec. 7, Clause (iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act read along with the proviso added by the Madras Amendment to that clause. In effect it has held that the plaintiff should value the suit and pay court-fee on the basis of half the value of the plaint-mentioned properties calculated under Clause (v) of Section 7.

(2.) In the Revision Petition it has been contended before me that this is not a correct view. It is not impossible to read the plaint in such a way as to make the prayer for declaration ancillary to the prayer for refund. But assuming for the sake of argument, that the two prayers have to be read independently, the case will fall, no doubt, under Section 7 Clause (iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act. The only question is whether the proviso added to that clause by Madras Act V of 1922 applies to the present case. The amendment provides for a case where "the relief sought is with reference to any immoveable property". It seems to me that the prima facie interpretation of that expression is that the dispute should in some sense relate to the title to immoveable property. This is obviously Jackson J's opinion in In re Venkatakrishna Pathar (1926) 52 M.L.J. 121. The learned Judge points out the difficulties and anomalies to which any other construction will lead. It is true that in that case the lower court had asked the plaintiff to pay court-fee on the basis of the Madras amendment to Section 7, Clause (iv) (c). But there was no complaint against it by the plaintiff, and the learned Judge had only to deal with the defendant's contention that the suit must be valued as one for possession.

(3.) The way, Jackson, J. distinguishes Vaiyapuri Chetty V/s. Ramachandra Thevar (1925) 21 L.W. 699 shows the inclination of his opinion.