NILAMANI PORICHA Vs. APPANNA PORICHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit to enforce the terms of an arrangement (Ex. B) entered into between the parties in 1898, in respect of a temple or mutt founded and endowed by one of their predecessors. Shortly before the date of this agreement, a suit had been filed by the present second defendant against the present first defendant impleading the present plaintiff as second defendant therein, to establish the joint right of that plaintiff with the first defendant to manage this institution. The learned District Judge who tried the suit (O.S. No. 34 of 1896) held against the joint right claimed by the plaintiff. It is unnecessary for us to canvass the grounds of this judgment because before the expiry of the time for perferring an appeal therefrom and, according to the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge, in view of a contemplated appeal by the then plaintiff the parties on the advice of respectable friends settled the dispute in accordance with the terms embodied in Ex. B.

(2.) Mr. Venkatachariar on behalf of the appellant before us mainly argued the appeal on the basis that this is something like an ordinary contract of which the plaintiff is now seeking specific performance by way of a direction couched in terms of an injunction and he contended that the agreement contains so many details that if the matter should be viewed as a claim for specific performance it is not an agreement which the court would think of specifically enforcing. This argument seems to us to rest on a fallacy. The arrangement is no doubt in a sense the result of an agreement between the parties but it is an agreement by which they defined the manner in which they are to carry out the duties of a trust which in one view of the law had devolved on them jointly. As pointed out by this Court in Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti (1903) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 192 at 201 and 202 : 13 M.L.J. 341 and by the Judicial Committee in Ramanathan Chetti V/s. Murugappa Chetti (1906) 33 I.A. 139 : 1. L.R. 29 Mad. 283 at 288 : 16 M.L.J. 265 (P.C.) such arrangements, if they are conducive to the interests of smooth administration of the affairs of the trust, are really in the nature of schemes framed for the management of the trust and will be binding upon the parties thereto and their representatives till modified either by common consent or in some manner known to law. It is not therefore correct to describe the action merely as one for specific performance of a contract.

(3.) Mr. Venkatachariar next argued that under the terms of Ex. B the position of the plaintiff and the second defendant was merely that of a kind of agent and not that of a co-trustee. We are unable to agree with this contention. There are no doubt certain clauses which deal with documents to be taken-in respect of the transactions of the trust, providing that the document should be taken in the first defendant's name as trustee. We do not understand those clauses to mean that the first defendant was to have any different legal status from his brothers. The only arrangement was that documents relating to the trust should be taken in his name, describing him as trustee. The other provisions of Ex. B make it clear that for legal purposes their rights were regarded as equal, though in respect of prasadams a small excess is provided for in favour of the first defendant. It is noteworthy that the right to settle the budget, the right to inspect the accounts and the right to decide upon loans or purchases out of the funds of the institution are given to the three jointly and the arrangement is intended to be perpetual so as to be binding upon the descendants of the parties as well. The argument that the plaintiff was merely constituted as an agent is therefore untenable.