LAWS(PVC)-1935-10-65

RANGASWAMI BATTAR Vs. ALASINGA BATTAR ALIAS VEERARAGHAVA BATTAR

Decided On October 24, 1935
RANGASWAMI BATTAR Appellant
V/S
ALASINGA BATTAR ALIAS VEERARAGHAVA BATTAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The first plaintiff in the suit is the appellant. There were two plaintiffs, both holders of archaka miras in the temple of Ranganathasami at Srirangam. The second plaintiff mortgaged for Rs. 2,000 his rights as archaka to the first plaintiff by a deed dated 21 January, 1926. The first plaintiff on the strength of this documeut tried to collect from the trustees of the temple the emoluments of the office. The District Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that this mortgage was void. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld this decision and the first plaintiff has preferred this appeal.

(2.) We are of opinion that this appeal must fail. This is a case in which a holder of a religious office has attempted to transfer his right to the office for consideration to another person who, though qualified to hold the office, is not in the line of succession from the transferor. Such a transfer according to the uniform current of decisions of this Court is void. The decisions of this Court are based upon the Privy Council ruling in Rajah Vurmah Valia V/s. Ravi Vurmah Kunhi Kutty (1876) L.R. 4 I.A. 76 : I.L.R. 1 Mad. 235 (P.C.). This was followed in Narasimha Thathacharya V/s. Anantha Bhatta (1881) I.L.R. 4 Mad. 391 and in Kuppa V/s. Dorasami (1882) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 76. The decision in this last case is exactly applicable to the case before us. The learned Judges refer to Rajah Vurmah Valia V/s. Ravi Vurmah Kunhi Kutty (1876) L.R. 4 I.A. 76 : I.L.R. 1 Mad. 235 (P.C.) and point out that according to the dictum of the Privy Council: No custom which could qualify the general principle of law that such trusts were inalienable had been established in the case and that the case discloses that the sale was for the pecuniary advantage of the trustee, a circumstance which would invalidate any such custom if it had been shown.

(3.) The learned Judges go on to say: It is sufficient to say than an alienation to a person not in the line of heirs though otherwise qualified for the performance of the office is not one which should be exempted from the general rule against the alienation of hereditary religious trusts and offices.