(1.) This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit, for damages on the ground that the defendant, a police constable, who cherished a grudge against the plaintiff, made a false report on 28 August 1927 at the police station stating that the plaintiff was leading a riotous mob. It was not till 15 March 1928 that this first information report was produced in Court when the plaintiff became aware of its existence. The suit was filed on 28 August 1928. The defendant in addition to denying the allegation that there was any malice or bad faith on the part of the defendant and denying that the report was false, further pleaded that the claim was barred by limitation. Both the Courts below have applied Art. 2, Limitation Act, and dismissed the claim, without going into the question of whether the defendant had, in fact, acted in good faith or not. The case came up in second appeal before a learned Judge of this Court, who referred it to a Bench of two Judges which then referred this case to a Full Bench. In Engliand where the question of interpretation of a similar statute containing the words "act done in pursuance of an enactment," has arisen, the view has been invariably expressed that the defendant cannot seek the protection of the enactment unless he shows that he acted in good faith. In Selmes V/s. Judge (1871) 6 Q.B. 724 Lord Blackburn remarked: It has long been decided that such a provision as that contained in this section is intended to protect persons from consequences of committing illegal acts, which are intended to be done under the authority of an Act of Parliament, but which by some mistake are not justified by the terms and cannot be defended by its provision.... I agree that if a person knows that he has not, under a statute, authority to do a certain thing, and yet intentionally does that thing, he cannot shelter himself by pretending that the thing was done with intent to carry out that statute.
(2.) We may also refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 23, p. 344, para. 965, where rulings on the interpretation of the corresponding section of the Public Authorities Protection Act (1893) are mentioned. See also Smith V/s. Shaw (1929) 109 E.R. 453. In Richard Spooner and Bomanjee Nowrojee V/s. Juddow (1846-50) 4 M.I.A. 358, at p. 379, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed: Our books actually swarm with decisions putting a contrary construction upon such enactments and there can be no rule more firmly established, than that if parties bona fide and not absurdly believe that they are acting in pursuance of statutes, and according to law, they are entitled to the special protection which the legislature intended for them, although they have done an illegal act.
(3.) In the Indian Limitation Act of 1871, Art. 2 ran as follows: For doing or for omitting to do, an act in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in British India.