MUNSHI MAHTON Vs. JUGESWARI PRASAD SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a very hard case for the appellants and from whatever point of view I look at it, I find it impossible to accept the argument of Mr. Mukharji appearing on behalf of the defendants-appellants. The plaintiffs are the landlords who brought an action to eject the defendants having served them with a notice to quit. A previous action had been brought in which the landlords had treated the defendants as tenants-at-will, but the Courts had rightly held that the defendants were not tenants-at-will and that a notice to quit was necessary. Hence this action out of which this appeal arises. Now the defendants purchased the house which they now occupy from the defendants-second party. It would appear that the defendants-second party took an oral lease of this land about four years ago and erected this house thereon. The purchase was made by the first party-defendants from the second party in 1922 and about the time of the purchase the defendants got from the plaintiffs an order which reads as follows: Order for the purchase of Dih land (land for residential use) to Shiboy Mahton and others of village Barh, pargana Ghayaspore, etc. etc., by Jugeshwari Prasad Singh, the malik and karta of the family, resident of village Gonawan. As prayed for, permission is given to you to purchase a residential house from Sham Lal Modi, son of Sanichar Modi. You do purchase the said residential house quite willingly with my permission and pay Rs. 25 as salami for recognizing you and registering your name. Hence an order in writing is given for future reference. Dated 3 Jaith 1329 Fs.

(2.) Now Mr. Mukharji does not contend, and it is impossible to contend, that under that document he got a lease in perpetuity or a lease for any period for that matter. It was merely a permission to purchase the interest of defendants-second party. It is not dissimilar to a license to sublet in cases where there is a covenant not to assign or sublet. Even had the defendants been minded to bring an action for specific performance against the plaintiffs, I very much doubt whether they could have succeeded as there is no contract Which might be described as a lease of the land for any period, much less a lease in perpetuity. But Mr. Mukharji contends that in the events which have happened the plaintiffs are estopped now from ejecting the defendants or, to put it in other words, they are estopped from saying that the defendants are not entitled to remain as tenants of this house in perpetuity. Reliance was placed on the decision in Forbes V/s. Ralli 1925 PC 146. Mr. Ameer Ali who delivered the opinion of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council applied the principle of Ramsden V/s. Dyson (1866) 1 HL 129 and there held that the defendants were entitled to a permanent lease having regard to a representation made by the plaintiff dated 31 December 1903. Now whatever may be said about the application of the principle laid down in Forbes v. Ralli 1925 PC 146, it seems to me to be a case which is very clearly different from the one which is before me. There had been a lease dated 22 June, 1894 in that case, and the manager of the defendant apparently being uncertain as to what was the nature of that lease, wrote to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs had made a representation which their Lordships of the Privy Council described as an estoppel: Referring to your conversation of this morning with Mr. Forbes and myself, I write at your request to say that the lease executed by Mr. C. Acatos, dated 22 June, 1894, is a permanent lease and gives you the right to erect buildings, but it does not entitle you to hold at fixed rate.

(3.) Reference was made to that authority in the well-known decision of Ariff v. Jadunath Mazumdar 1931 PC 79 where Lord Russell states: Reference is made by the learned Judge to the case of Forbes V/s. Ralli 1925 PC 146 before this Board, but that decision was based upon an estoppel grounded upon a statement of fact.