BHAVANSI RANGAPPA Vs. KAMISETTI VENKATASWAMI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The main point for decision in this second Appeal is a question of limitation and that turns upon the true legal effect of certain transactions which took place between the parties and one Subramaniam on the 23 and 24 March, 1926. The defendant had purchased some land from Subramaniam and owed him money in that connection. There was a suit O.S. No. 588 of 1924 arising out of that sale and it was compromised on 23 March, 1926, by Ex. A. It is sufficient to say that under the compromise the defendant and another agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 850 to Subramaniam; but as they had no money to pay on that date and Subramaniam was not prepared to accept a promise from the defendant, it was arranged that on behalf of the defendant the present plaintiffs should execute a promissory note for Rs. 850 in favour of Subramaniam. A. promissory note was accordingly executed by the plaintiffs to Subramaniam on the 24 March, 1926. I am willing to accept in a general way the story of the defendant that the idea at the time was that the defendant should send money to the plaintiffs as soon as the defendant went to his village. Though certain other particulars pleaded as part of this agreement are found against by the Courts below, the Lower Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that the arrangement between the defendant and the plaintiffs must have been that the defendant should send the plaintiffs money as soon as he reached home. But I am not on this ground able to agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the cause of action for a suit by the plaintiffs against the defendant accrued on the date of the promissory note itself.

(2.) There is some confusion in the argument in paragraph 10 of the Lower Appellate Court's judgment. A promissory note is no doubt ordinarily payable immediately but that is so as between the parties to the promissory note, not as between the plaintiffs and the present defendant. That is why the attempt on the part of the defendant was to bring the case under Art. 65 of the Limitation Act, by suggesting that the cause of action arose a few days after the date of the promissory note, because money should have been paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs within those few days. The trial Court held that the suit was governed by Article 61 of the Limitation Act. This no doubt is a possible view and is justified by the fact that in Girraj Singh V/s. Mul Chand (1907) I.L.R. 29 All. 627 the Allahabad High Court dealing with somewhat similar circumstances, left it open whether a suit of this kind will be governed by Art. 61 or Art. 83. But as I understand the transaction between the parties the position was that as between Subramaniam and the defendant, Subramaniam released the defendant from liability, in consideration of the plaintiffs executing the promissory note for the amount due by the defendant to Subramaniam. In such circumstances it would not be correct to describe the present case as one of money payable to the plaintiffs for money paid for the defendant. I would prefer to hold in accordance with the observations of the Privy Council in National Bank of Upper India V/s. Bansidhar (1929) L.R. 57 I.A. 1 : I.L.R. 5 Luck. 1 (P.C.) that as between Subramaniam and the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs became the principal debtor but that as between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the defendant remained the person ultimately liable for the discharge of the debt. The arrangement that the defendant should send money immediately to the plaintiffs merely amounts to this that the defendant should put plaintiffs in funds to meet the pronote claim.

(3.) I am not able to agree with Mr. Narasimhachar that the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant is that of creditor and debtor and that the plaintiffs became absolutely entitled to the money whether he paid Subramaniam or not or was sued by Subramaniam or not. Whether plaintiffs are to be treated as having entered into the transaction as an agent of the defendant or at the request of the defendant, the position will be that the defendant should put plaintiffs in funds to pay off Subramaniam and in default of doing so, should be held bound to imdemnify the plaintiffs if ever the plaintiffs should be compelled to pay. In this view Art. 83 will be the proper Art. applicable to the suit. As the promissory note amount was admittedly paid off only on 7 October, 1931, this suit is in time.