MR KAPLIDEVA MALVIYA Vs. HON BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HON BLE JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT AT ALLAHABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from an order convicting the applicants, an Advocate and editor and a printer and publisher of the offence of contempt of Court and sentencing the Advocate to a fine of Rs. 10 and ordering each of the three persons to pay Rs. 100 as costs. The offence is found to have been committed on account of the publication of an article by him headed "A Scandalous Situation" in the Leader. The learned Counsel for the applicant contends that his application for leave falls under Section 109, Civil Procedure Code, and urges before us that the order of the High Court has been passed in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction, particularly as the original notice issued to him was headed "Civil Side Revisional Jurisdiction." The learned Government Advocate takes preliminary objection, that no application for leave to appeal lies inasmuch as (1) contempt is a criminal matter and the punishment is in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction of the High Court, and (1868) 5 Moore. P.C. (N.S.) 111; L.R. 2 P.C. 106 : 16 E.R. 457 that the inherent jurisdiction exercised by this Court , as a Court of Record is exclusive and the order passed is final.

(2.) The first question for consideration is whether proceedings for contempt of the High Court are at all in the nature of a civil proceeding. A Division Bench of this Court took cognizance of contempt committed by the publication of the Advocate's article. The Bench ordered notices to be issued to the Advocate as well as the editor and the printer and the publisher of the paper "to show cause why they should not be convicted and punished for the offence of contempt of this Court ." In the order itself as signed by the Judges, there was no suggestion that the notice was being issued in the exercise of any civil jurisdiction. On the other hand, as the opposite party were called upon to show cause why theyshould not be convicted and punished for the offence of contempt, the order was prima facie, in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction or the inherent jurisdiction of this Court . The office numbered the case as "Miscellaneous Case No. 435 of1934", In the matter of an Advocate of Allahabad , and on the day's list also the case vyas shown simply as "Miscellaneous Case No. 435 of 1934", without mentioning that it was a Miscellaneous Civil case. But the notice that was issued by the Office to the Advocate was written out on a printed form which had the words "Civil Side Jurisdiction" printed on it. The notice was issued under the signature of the Deputy Registrar, and the printed words were not struck out, but the word "Revisional" was added. The contents of the notice, however, warned the Advocate to appear personally to show cause why he should not be convicted and punished for the offence of contempt of the High Court committed by the publication. The Advocate could not possibly have been misled by the issue of the notice on a printed form used for notices on the Civil Side. No particular form of the notice is prescribed by the rules of mis Court. The Advocate had billed upon to appear in order that he may have an opportunity to show cause. We are, therefore, unable to hold that a mere misdescription in the notice issued by the office could, in any sense, make the proceeding one of a civil nature. The Advocate could not have been under any misapprehension as to the true character of the proceeding. We arc of opinion that the form used for the notice is wholly immaterial for the purposes of deciding what the nature of the jurisdiction exercised was and that the misdescription was of too trivial a nature and cannot possibly confer civil jurisdiction on the High Court.

(3.) We have not the least doubt in our minds that the proceedings were in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court and of a criminal nature. We would not say that merely because the Advocate was an Officer of this Court , the proceeding against him was of an administrative character. The conviction and the fine imposed are themselves sufficient to show at least that the proceeding was not of a civil nature. In the matter of Edward Hutchinson Pollard (2), their Lordships clearly laid down that the contempt of Court was "a criminal offence".