SOMASUNDARAM CHETTI Vs. NACHAL ACHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from the order of the District Judge of Bam-nad, dated 3 April 1933, in appeal from the decree of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Devakottah, dated 12 September 1932 dismissing O.S. No. 155 of 1931, a suit by the plaintiff principal against her agent for accounts, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The District Judge in appeal did not decide the question of limitation himself but remanded the suit for fresh disposal according to law, the only ground alleged for the remand being that the learned Subordinate Judge had erred in deciding the case as a question of law and should have taken evidence in the case. The sole ground for remand is based on a misapprehension, or rather, on two misapprehensions, namely, that the Subordinate Judge had decided the question as a question, of pure law Mid that he had not taken evidence in the case. As a matter of fact the Subordinate Judge's judgment clearly shows that he was perfectly aware of the fact that the question though one of limitation really depended on a finding on a question of fact, namely, when the agency terminated. In the second place, the Subordinate Judge had taken evidence, and referred to the evidence, which was wholly documentary, in his judgment. He also relied on certain admissions made before him by the plaintiff's advocate, and, in particular on the admission that the defendant had left Dedaye, the place where he was to carry on the business of agent, after handing over charge to his successor more than three years prior to the date of suit. It was after considering the evidence and the admissions that the Subordinate Judge found as a matter of fact that the defendant had ceased to represent the principal in respect of the business for which he had been appointed agent, more than three years prior to the institution of the suit. The order of the District Judge remanding the suit after reversing the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be supported, because the reasons given in support of it are the result of misapprehension; and it cannot be defended or supported on any other ground. If the question of fact were of a complicated character or if the evidence were voluminous it might be desirable to call for a finding thereon from the lower appellate Court. But in this case the question is comparatively simple and the evidence is quite scanty.

(2.) There is really no dispute as to what the terms of the agency were. Ex. A, the salary chit, is clear on the point. It is equally clear from the admission of the plaintiff's advocate that the defendant actually left Dedaye after handing over charge to his successor Who had been appointed by the plaintiff, or rather by the plaintiff's husband, more than three years prior to the date of institution of the suit, namely on 1 October 1928. No doubt he returned to India and appeared before the principal only on 13 October 1928 for the purpose of getting the balance of salary due to him and for having his account passed. This however does not throw any light on; the question as to when the agency terminated. The purpose of the agency was to carry on business on behalf of the principal in Dedaye. The rendering of accounts and the drawing of arrears of salary has nothing to do with the business of the agency as such. It is only a matter of accounting between the principal and the agent, and has nothing to do with the representation of the principal by the agent in dealings with third persons. The definition of an agent in the Contract Act is: An agent is a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons.

(3.) The question as to when the agent; is to get his arrears of salary, and under what conditions, viz. whether only on getting his accounts passed, had nothing to do with the question of the termination of the agency.