LAWS(PVC)-1935-3-203

MEHRZIA BEGAM Vs. GULZAR SINGH

Decided On March 07, 1935
MEHRZIA BEGAM Appellant
V/S
GULZAR SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a plaintiff's appeal. She is an assignee of land revenue in respect of certain zamindari property and the defendants are cosharers in the same property. She brought a suit under Section 223, Agra Tenancy Act, Local Act 3 of 1926 against the defendants for arrears of land revenue in respect of the years 1334, 1335 and 1336 fasli. So far as the present appeal is concerned the only question, which is in controversy is the question whether a joint decree should be passed against the cosharcrs for the entire-claim or whether the separate liability of the various defendants should be apportioned and a decree fixing the separate liability of the various cosharers should be passed.

(2.) When this point was taken before the assistant collector for the first time he held that the suit could be filed against the cosharers collectively and. the decree should be passed against them jointly. On appeal the learned District Judge was of the opinion that the "liability of the defendants should be specified in the decree" and he therefore remanded the case to the learned Assistant Collector. On remand the trial Court apportioned the liability and passed a decree fixing the share of each cosharer. On appeal the learned District Judge confirmed the decree of the trial Court and, when the point was taken before him that the order of his predecessor in office directing that each defendant was liable separately only to the extent of the revenue due from him was wrong, he held that he could not sit in appeal over the order of his predecessor and he could not grant any relief on that point to the plaintiff.

(3.) The plaintiff has therefore come to this Court and urges this plea before me. A preliminary objection is taken by the respondents that by reason of the provisions of Section 105, Clause 2, Civil P.C., the plaintiff is precluded from disputing correctness of the order of remand, but there is no force in the preliminary objection because the prohibition exists only if an appeal lay from the order of remand and under Section 249, Agra Tenancy Act, no appeal lies from any order passed in appeal. The plaintiff is therefore not debarred from urging the point after the decree of the lower appellate Court on the second occasion.