HARI RAMAYYA Vs. BHAGAVATULU VENKATACHELAPATI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by a reversioner, who sued to recover possession of the estate of one Ananthayya. The last male owner died in 1886, leaving a widow and a daughter. The widow died in October 1925 and as the daughter and a son born to the daughter had predeceased the widow, the plaintiff filed this suit in January 1927, claiming to recover possession of the properties alleged to belong to the estate. Several sets of defendants were impleaded in the suit and various questions were raised by the different sets of defendants. For the purpose of this appeal, it is sufficient to deal with the one question raised by defendant 47, who claims to have been adopted to Ananayya by his widow on 10 June 1925. There is scarcely any dispute before us either as to the truth of the relationship alleged by the plaintiff or as to the factum of the adoption of defendant 47. The only question argued before us is as to the validity of the adoption.

(2.) The adopted son relies upon the consent given by a nephew, of the plaintiff (D. W. 7 in the case) and one Chalamiah (D. W. 2) who is also a more distant reversioner than the plaintiff. Their consent is evidenced by Ex. 11. Though some suggestions have been made that their consent was given for improper reasons or at any rate was not the result of the exercise of an independent discretion, we see no reason for taking this argument seriously. No corrupt motive has been proved beyond a suggestion that they very readily consented when they came to the village on 9 June, the date on which Ex. 11 was given. Their evidence is that they had been previously spoken to about the matter; but, even putting that aside, there can be no doubt that they were well aware of the circumstances of the family and there was no very intricate problem which required deliberation for a number of days.

(3.) The consent under Ex. 11 could not be invalidated on that account. There is equally little force in the argument that in giving consent under Ex. 11 these two sapindas must have been under the impression that the plaintiff had already consented and that therefore it was not the result of an independent discretion. Ex. 11 does not recite any consent by the plaintiff. Their statements from the witness-box are to the effect that to their very knowledge the plaintiff orally agreed. This may be true or may not be true, but on the strength of that statement it is obvious there could be no question of any misrepresentation to them by the widow or of their having acted on the faith of that representation. A reservation to the effect that in such cases there can be no objection to the consent on the ground of want of independent exercise of judgment is clearly made in the judgment in Subramaniam V/s. Venkamma (1903) 26 Mad 627 at p. 631. Further these two sapindas distinctly say that they gave their consent because they thought that the adoption was a proper act and D. W. 7 goes the length of saying that he would have given his consent whether the plaintiff had consented or not. We are therefore unable to uphold the objections to the validity of the consent given under Ex. 11.