ANNAMALAI CHETTIAR Vs. SRMARRAMANATHAN CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are petitions by some of the respondents in reported in 1934 Mad 367 for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from the order therein and for issue of a certificate that the case is a fit one for such appeal. A.S. No. 418 of 1932 was an appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Devakotta dated 7 November 1932 dismissing O.S. No. 109 of 1930 on his file on the preliminary ground of multifariousness or misjoinder of defendants and of causes of action. In appeal this Court held that there was no such misjoinder and remanded the suit to the original Court for disposal on the merits. It is this order which is sought to be taken in appeal to His Majesty in Council. It is clear that this order is not a decree or final order. The Advocate-General who appeared for the petitioners intimated that he did not propose to argue that the order was a decree or final order, though he desired it to be noted that he did not abandon the point or make any concession regarding it. The point is however well settled, and it is enough to refer to the latest ruling of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Abdul Rahman V/s. D.K. Cassim and Sons 1933 11 Rang 58. It follows therefore that the present petitions are not maintainable under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 109, Civil P.C., and they were actually argued as if they were made only under Clause (c) of that section and can be allowed only on the ground that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. It was pointed out by Lord Hobhouse in Banarsi Prasad V/s. Kashi Krishna Narain (1901) 23 All 227, that this clause is clearly intended to meet special cases, such, for example, as those in which the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance.

(2.) In a later case, Radhakrishna Ayyar V/s. Swaminatha Ayyar 1921 44 Mad 293, Lord Buckmaster observed that this clause contemplates cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute, and where there are questions as for example those relating to religious rights and ceremonies, to caste and family rights, of such matters as the reduction of the capital of companies, as well as questions of wide public importance. Again, in the words of Sir Walter Schwabe, Raja Rajeswara Sethupathi V/s. Thiruneela-kantan Servai 1923 C.J. in 44 MLJ 217: What is contemplated is a class of cases in which there may be involved questions of public importance, or which may be important precedents governing numerous other cases, or in which, while the right in dispute is not exactly measurable in money, it is of great public or private importance.

(3.) It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that this clause would cover a case in which a substantial question of law is raised which is of great public or private importance. The substantial questions of law raised in the present case, as formulated by the Advocate- General, are (1) whether Order 1, Rule 3, Civil P.C., can be so interpreted as to permit of joinder of causes of action when such joinder is not permitted under Order 2, Rule 3, Civil P.C. and (2) whether on a proper construction of Order 1, Rule 3, Civil P.C. the allegations in the plaint allege the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions.