NATHU LAL Vs. RAGHUBIR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against an order purporting to be in review setting aside a decree on the ground of fraud or undue influence. The application for review alleged undue influence. The review has been granted upon a general finding apparently of fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc.

(2.) A preliminary objection is taken that no appeal lies; that it is barred by Order 47, Rule 7, in that none of the only three conditions in which an appeal is allowed is applicable to the case. For the appellant this is now practically conceded, but we are invited to hear the appeal as an application on the revisional side and to set aside the order granting the review on the ground that none of the conditions which under Order 47, Rule 1, are essential to a review existed in this case, and that the order granting the review was, therefore, an illegal exercise of jurisdiction. I think this contention is correct. Under Order 47, Rule 1, a review may be admitted on any of the three grounds set out in Sub-section (1) of the rule. It is conceded that the plea of fraud or undue influence alleged in this case was not accompanied by the discovery of any new and important matter or evidence; nor is it urged that there was any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. It has, therefore, to be conceded by counsel for the opposite party who obtained the review that his plea did not come within the first ground. It is, however urged that the words "for any other sufficient reason" are sufficiently wide to cover a plea of fraud or undue influence.

(3.) Now it has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chhajju Ram v. Neki AIR 1922 PC 112 (February 27th, 1924) that the other sufficient reason must be "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately preceding." We have had a large number of cases quoted to us, but two tests to be applied to these cases are clear: (1) That any case in which it has been held that fraud is not a reason within the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1, will help the decree-holder to resist the setting aside of his decree; (2) that, in view of the Privy Council no decision that fraud comes within the words "other sufficient reason" will help the applicant for review unless it is clear that decision recognized the limitation (now definitely declared by the Privy Council) that the reason must be analogous to the two earlier reasons specified by the rule.