JAGADISHPORE TEA CO LTD Vs. MCLEOD AND CO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case raises the same question which came up before us for consideration in Order No. 1091 of 1924. There we held that applications under the Indian Companies Act relating to Companies doing business in the mofussil should be made in the Original Side of this Court. After we had pronounced our judgment this matter came up before another Bench of this Court which issued notices to the Incorporated Law Society and the Vakils Association probably with the view that the question should be re-argued. This case has come up before us for hearing and the Incorporated Law Society and the Vakils Association are represented before us. Since on the previous occasion we fully heard the argument on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society and the Vakils Association we do not think that we should allow them to argue the point over again. But as the Petitioner has expressed a desire to have the questions reargued we have allowed Dr. Basak to place before us further materials so that he might induce us to change our view. We have heard Dr. Basak fully and 1 have given my best considerations to the matter, but I am unable to change the view that I formed on the previous occasion. On the previous occasion Dr. Mitter appearing on behalf of the Vakils Association made submissions which we considered in our judgment delivered in that case. Dr. Basak has supplemented the arguments advanced by Dr. Mitter on the former occasion.

(2.) The first point raised by Dr. Basak is that the alteration in the law as enacted in the Indian Companies Act, VI of 1882, by the present Act of 1913 indicates the change of mind of the legislature and invests the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction with power to deal with matters relating to Companies working in the mofussil. By Section 3 of the Act of 1882 the word "Court" was defined as follows:- "Court means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction." In the present Indian Companies Act, VII of 1913, this definition has been omitted and "Court" is thus defined in Section 2: "The Court" means the Court having jurisdiction under this "Act" and in Section 3 it is said that the Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be "the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the Company is situate." Dr. Basak argues from this alteration in the definition of the word "Court" that though under the Act of 1882 the High Court in its Original Jurisdiction was vested with power to deal with matters relating to all Companies the change in the definition in the present Act has empowered the Appellate Side of the High Court to deal with these matters; and that by the words "the High Court" in Section 3 of Act VII of 1913 the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction is meant. I do not think that this interpretation of the law is correct. According to Dr. Basak's reading of the law this Court in its Appellate Side should have jurisdiction also over Companies carrying on business in Calcutta and not in its Original Side, a position hardly tenable. If the alteration in the law gives any indication of the intention of the legislature it does in my opinion support the contrary view. It is conceded that before the Act of 1913 all matters relating to Companies whether situated in the Presidency Towns or outside them were dealt with by the High Court in its Original Jurisdiction. Now it may be interesting to find out why this alteration in the law has been made in the Act of 1913. To my mind the alteration was made in order to include within the definition of the word "Court" such Courts of highest Civil Jurisdiction in a province which are not High Courts and such High Courts which have no Original Civil Jurisdiction. It was not intended by the legislature to take away the jurisdiction of the Original Side of the High Court and to vest it in the Appellate Side. The alteration in the law therefore does not support the contention of the learned Advocate.

(3.) It is next argued that the jurisdiction of the Original Side of the High Court is circumscribed by the provisions of the Letters Patent and it cannot be extended. Clause 11 of the Letters Patent and Section 109 of the Government of India Act vest the Governor-General in Council with wide powers to extend the limit of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court. The Act of 1913, as the Act of 1882, may be taken to be a legislative enactment by which the Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court has been extended to embrace questions relating to Companies situated outside the Presidency Towns. For the view that we held on the last occasion and to which I still adhere, we relied on the meaning of the word "High Court" in the Act of 1913. By the word " High Court" is meant the High Court as a whole including its Appellate and original Jurisdiction. There is no justification for the view that " High Court," means only the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction. If that were the intention of the legislature in altering the definition of the term " Court", it should have expressed clearly that the Court dealing with Companies is the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction. I do not wish to repeat the arguments which we adopted on the previous occasion; but it is clear that the expression " High Court" in the Act of 1913 is intended to include all the Sides of the High Court and is as equally applicable to High Courts having Original Civil Jurisdiction as to High Courts which have no Original Side.