KONDI RAMJI BHOSLE Vs. VITHALRAO LAXMANRAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff as an inamdar brought a suit No. 36 of 1918 in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Wai for possession against the defendant on the ground that he was a yearly tenant and was liable to be evicted on being given a proper notice. The final decision of the High Court in that case was to the effect that the defendant was a permanent tenant under Section 83 of the Land Revenue Code, and the point as to enhancement of rent was then left untouched as it was not originally claimed in the plaint.

(2.) The plaintiff has now brought this suit for enhancement of the rent at the rate of Rs. 125 a year together with Rs. 22 as unpaid rent for two years before suit. It was urged that the notice by the plaintiff to the defendant to enhance the rent was not according to law, but the Judge held that the notice was legal and proper. He also found that having regard to the usage and custom prevailing in the locality the plaintiff was entitled to ask for the enhancement of rent. And on a consideration of the evidence he directed the defendant to pay enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 25 a year as well as the rent due for the previous two years before suit. It appears to have been urged before the Judge that the defendant was entitled to the rights of an occupant in an alienated village by virtue of Section 217 of the Land Revenue Code. It is not easy to follow the argument which is constantly being put forward in the Courts.

(3.) The same point was argued in appeal before the District Judge, who after referring to the amendment in 1913 of Section 217 of the Land Revenue Code, said: Since the amendment one cannot rely on these decisions Nanabhai Bajibhai V/s. Collector of Kaira [1910] 34 Bom. 686 and Daddo V/s. Dinhar Vishnu [1919] 43 Bom. 77, because the words "holders of land" have bsen substituted for "occupants". The result of the amendment is that holders in general have the same rights in alienated villages after a settlement as they have in unalienated villages. A holder may be, a mere tenant. If so, he has merely a tenant's rights. It is admitted that the present appellant is a tenant, the origin of whose tenancy owing to antiquity cannot be determined. He is not the khatedar. He has rightly been held not to be an "occupant."