ECHIKAN CHARAKARE KELU NAIR Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF SOUTH CANARA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts of this second appeal are stated by my learned brother whose judgment I had the advantage of perusing.

(2.) If the question before us is what is the proper rate of assessment on the suit land ? we are precluded from entering upon its consideration by Section 58 of the Revenue Recovery Act. The Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to do the work of the Settlement Department, whether that department has come to a correct or incorrect conclusion in respect of a particular plot of land. In my opinion this is the proper scope of Section 58. But when the question before us is whether Government, having entered into a binding engagement, by which the assessment is fixed at a certain rate for a certain period, can alter the rate during that period to say that that Section 58 is a bar to our consideration of the question is to say that the section enables the Government to avoid the binding nature of contracts relating to revenue. I do not think the words any question as to the rate of land revenue payable to Government1 were intended to support such a contention.

(3.) This leads me to the question whether there is any binding engagement on the part of the Government. On this point I see no reason to differ from my learned brother's conclusion, viz., that the notification of the Government, dated 6 November, 1902, supplemented by the Government Order, dated 17 April, 1903, as understood in the light of declarations of Government Policy, amount to a grant of rights on the ryotwari holders in the District of South Canara for a period of thirty years. Though there are facts in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Ramanujachariar . which distinguish that case from the present, it supports our conclusion to this extent.