(1.) This is an appeal from an order of Buckland, J., dated 13 May last, refusing to adjudicate the respondent an insolvent, at the instance of the appellant. The learned Judge was asked to reconsider his order on 25 May, but he adhered to his previous decision and dismissed the application.
(2.) The acts of insolvency alleged in the petition for adjudication were two in number, but the second one is not now relied on and need not be considered in this appeal, and the act of insolvency relied on is that, in execution of a money decree, obtained by one Jeebandas Agarwalla, in Suit No. 2349 of 1923, immovable property of the respondent was attached on 20 February 1924, and remained under attachment, at the date of she presentation of the petition namely 28 April 1925.
(3.) There is no doubt that the attachment of 20 February 1924, was an available act of insolvency, had the petition been presented within three months of the 20 February 1924, but the appellant contends that, as the attachment was subsisting at the date of the presentation of the petition for adjudication, it is an available act of insolvency even though more than three months have elapsed since the expiration of 21 days from the date of the attachment. The argument urged in support of this is based on the wording of Section 9 (e), Presidency Towns insolvency Act, which provides that a debtor commits an act of insolvency, if any of his property has been sold or attached for a period of not less than 21 days in execution of the decree of any Court for the payment of money. It is said that, by virtue of the words not less than 21 days," the act of insolvency is a continuing act and that the greater includes the less and that a petition could be founded on the attachment of 20 February 1921, not merely for a period of three months after the expiration of 21 days from that date, but during any time that the attachment remained after the 21 days, and, I suppose, for three months after its removal.