(1.) This is a suit for rent in respect of certain lands called Badava lands situated in a riverbed. The District Judge has found that these lands were neither Kambattam nor old waste nor ryoti nor of any of the other descriptions mentioned in Section 3 (16)(a), (b) and (c) of the Estates Land Act. He has in conseguence held that the revenue Courts have no jurisdiction to try a suit for rent in respect of these lands. He has, however, cmitted to notice that the definition of rent in Section 3(11), runs as follows: Rent, means whatever is lawfully payable in money or in kind or in both to a landholder for the use or occupation of laud in his estate for the purpose of agriculture
(2.) That is to say it includes whatever is payable not merely on ryoti land or old waste or Kambattam but on any land whatever. Under Section 19, a revenue Court is debarred from trying a suit for rent on Kambattam land, but all other suits by a landholder for recovery of rent seem to be covered by Art. 8 of the Schedule, Part A. The District Judge was therefore wrong in declining jurisdiction in this case and his order must be set aside. I would further point out that he should not have dismissed the suit but should have returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. That is not of much importance now, as I direct him to restore the appeal to file and dispose of it in- accordance with law. The costs here will abide the result.
(3.) The Memorandum of Objections does not lie because it merely relates to an argument which the respondents are entitled to put forward but is not in any way an objection to the decree. It must, therefore be rejected.