NIRMAL CHANDRA DE Vs. KING-EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the accused Nirmal Chandra De alias H.K. Roy has been convicted under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act read with Secs.120B and 116, I.P.C., and sentenced to nine months rigorous imprisonment. The case for the prosecution, shortly put, is that the Accused Nos. 3 and 4 (who is the present appellant) entered into a conspiracy to possess firearms and ammunition and negotiated with Accused No. 2, a Chinaman, for the purchase of some eight pistols and ammunition. There were several meetings between the second accused, and the third and the fourth accused but the actual sale, for some reason or other, did not take place. Some portion of the price was advanced to the second accused but further negotiations broke off because either they could not come to terms or that the accused persons expected some people to come from outside and take delivery of the pistols but they did not come in time. The evidence in the case mainly consists of police officers and spies. In a case like this it is difficult for the prosecution to secure outside and independent evidence. The prosecution has to depend upon evidence of people who are engaged in detecting crimes of this sort. In a case like this therefore the evidence of such persons should be scrutinized and received with a great deal of caution. We have gone through the evidence and have considered all the submissions made on behalf of the appellant by the learned vakil appearing for him, and we have come to the conclusion that, so far as evidence goes, it has to our satisfaction established the occurrence as related by the prosecution.

(2.) The first objection taken to the conviction is with regard to the insufficiency of evidence relating to identification. The two superior police officers engaged in this matter no doubt were unable to identify the accused because they were hiding themselves in a room from where the accused could not be seen. But the other evidence on the record satisfactorily establishes the identity of the accused. In this connexion the statement of the accused must also be taken into consideration. The occurrence took place in a house in Bow Street and he admits that on the day of occurrence he was taken by the other accused who, according to him, asked him to wait within the square near the house and himself went inside the house. The presence of the accused near the place of occurrence and at about the time at which the occurrence took place is particularly admitted.

(3.) It is next argued that the conviction ought to have been under Section 22 of the Arms Act and not under Section 19(f). That section says that whoever knowingly purchases any arms, etc., etc., or delivers any arms, etc., etc., etc, into the possession of any person without previously ascertaining, etc., etc., The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate is right in his view that this section deals with persons without licenses dealing with licensed vendors or purchasers or with persons with licenses dealing with unlicensed vendors or purchasers. It is therefore not applicable to the present case.