NOWROJI RUSTOMJI WADIA Vs. GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In 1917 the Municipality of Bombay acquired a plot of land for purposes connected with an existing hospital, and the usual statutory proceedings took place before the Collector of Bombay to fix the amount of compensation to be paid for the land. The owner, being dissatisfied with the amount awarded, viz., Rs. 98,724, claimed a reference to the High Court, and in 1920 Kajiji J. varied the Collector's award by increasing the rate to be allowed per square yard superficial from Rs. 8 to Rs. 10. This raised the total compensation to Rs. 1,39,970. Upon an appeal by the Municipality the High Court set aside the learned Judge's decree and dismissed the reference. They thus in effect confirmed the Collector's award. From this decision the claimant now appeals.

(2.) The value to be placed at a given moment on a plot of land, which is not in the market or the subject of bargain and sale, but owes a large part of any value it possesses to the prospective results of development work, to be undertaken thereafter at an uncertain time and at an estimated cost, is not only in its essence a question of fact but is one upon which, almost above any other, opinions will differ, without its being possible to give irrefragable reasons for any particular conclusion.

(3.) It has been declared in decisions of the Board, by which their lordships are now bound, that appeals in valuation cases will only be entertained on questions of principle: See Secretary of State for India V/s. India General Steam Navigation and Railway Company Ld. (1909) I. L. R 36 Cal. 967, P. C.; Rangoon Botatoung Company V/s. The Collector, Rangoon (1912) L. R. 391. A. 197, 201, S.C. 14 Bom. L. Section 838 per Lord Macnaghten; Charan, Das V/s. Amir Khan (1920) L. R. 47 I. A. 255, 264, S. C. 22 Bom. L. R. 1370 per Lord Buckmaster-"this Board will not interfere with any question of valuation"-and Rai Bahadur Lala Narsinga Das v. Secretary of State for India (December 5,1924, No. 40 of 1924). Errors in law, including errors in appreciating or applying the rules of evidence or the judicial methods of weighing evidence, are matters that can and will be dealt with on appeal by this Board, but when, as in the present case, a difference of opinion has occurred between two Indian Courts upon the number of rupees per yard to be allowed for a plot of land, as to which their lordships can form no opinion of their own, it would be alike unprofitable and impracticable to embark on a comparison of the decisions of these Courts, In oases relating to the acquisition of land the whole matter, both of fact and law, is a proper subject of appeal in India, for there local knowledge and experience enable the learned Judges to form useful judgments upon the whole case. The amending Act of 1921 declares awards under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to be decreed, so as to bring them within the general rules as to appeals to this Board, but it does not prescribe any special mode, in which they are to be treated. This Board has found it necessary to limit the extent of the inquiry, in order to spare the parties costly and fruitless litigation. Just as in oases where there are concurrent findings of fact in the Indian Courts, it has long been the general rule of the Board not to allow such findings to be re-opened here (Naragunty Lutchhmeedavamah V/s. Vengama Naidoo (1881) 9 M. I. A. 68, 87; Umrao Begam V/s. Irshad Husain (1894) L. R. 21 I. A. 163, so it has now been settled that this Board will not review the decree of an Indian appellate Court merely upon questions of value. Where their lordships have neither the materials nor the experience on which to found an opinion of their own, in a matter where the opinions of competent Courts in India differ (and a fortiori where they concur). It is not their practice to interfere, as an appellate tribunal, unless there appears to be error in law or miscarriage of justice.