LAWS(PVC)-1925-6-124

KEHRI SINGH Vs. THIRPAL

Decided On June 24, 1925
KEHRI SINGH Appellant
V/S
THIRPAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from an order of remand passed by the District Judge in an appeal from a Revenue Court. A preliminary objection has been taken that no appeal lies. This objection is well founded. Under Section 175 of the Agra Tenancy Act no appeal from any decree or order passed by any Court under that Act lies except as therein provided. Under Section 177 an appeal is provided from a decree of a District Judge passed on appeal but no appeal is provided from an order passed by a District Judge. It is, therefore, apparent that no appeal from his order of remand, which, of course is not a decree, lies to this Court. This view is concluded by the decision of the Full Bench case of Zohra V/s. Mangu Lal (1906) 28 All 753 which has been followed recently in the case of Gulzari Lal V/s. Latif Husain (1916) 38 All 181.

(2.) The learned vakil for the appellant, however, contends that an appeal lies under para. 11 of the Letter Patent of this Court. In our opinion no such appeal lies under that paragraph at all. Under that paragraph this High Court is constituted a Court of appeal from the Civil Courts and has power to exercise appellate jurisdiction "in such cases as are subject to appeal to the said High Court by virtue of any laws or regulations now in force." The constitution of this High Court as a Court of appeal is quite a different thing from saying that this Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from every decree or order passed by a Subordinate Court. If, therefore, there is no law or regulation which allows an appeal to it, the High Court cannot assume an appellate jurisdiction. The power of revision and superintendence, however, is much wider.

(3.) The learned vakil for the appellant next urged that his appeal should be treated as a revision and that inasmuch as the learned District Judge has assumed jurisdiction which was not vested in him, this Court should interfere in revision. This argument is based on the assumption that no appeal lay to the District Judge because no question of proprietary title had been raised in the first Court and no question of jurisdiction had been decided by it. The reply of the learned advocate for the respondent is that the High Court has no power of revision in a revenue matter at all. The qustion whether the High Court has power to interfere in revision has been considered in a number of cases which are by no means unanimous and so far there is no Full Bench decision on this matter. The position is as follows: