LAWS(PVC)-1925-3-124

RABINDRA NATH DUTT Vs. ABDUL AHAD AND CO

Decided On March 26, 1925
RABINDRA NATH DUTT Appellant
V/S
ABDUL AHAD AND CO Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this matter a point of some novelty has arisen. Mr. P.C. Basu counsel on behalf of one Rabindra Nath Dutt applies for the admission of the plaint under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the suit being one purporting to be laid under O.37 of the Civil P. C..

(2.) The cause of action has arisen on nonpayment of principal and interest due on a promissory note executed by the defendant so far back as the 29 July 1922. The executant of the promissory note undertook to repay the principal with interest at the rata of 12 per cent. per annum on demand. The Master, before whom the plaint was presented in the first instance, refused to admit it as a plaint under Order 37 on the ground that the suit has not been brought within six months from the date when the debt became due and payable, and he accordingly held that the plaint could not be admitted. As I understand the matter, the Master raised no objection to the admission of the plaint as a suit brought in the ordinary manner on a negotiable instrument, the period of limitation in respect of which is three years.

(3.) Mr. Basu urges that the suit should be treated as one under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure and he argues in the following manner. He says that under Art. 5 of the Limitation Act of 1877, the period of limitation in respect of suits under Chap. 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1882 (which corresponds to Order 37 of the present Civil P. C.) was six months from the date on which the debt became due and payable, but that there has bean a material alteration in the language of Art. 5 of the present Limitation Act and that the effect of the alteration is that the period of six months prescribed therein is applicable now only to suits instituted under the summary procedure referred to in Section 128 (2) (f) of the present Civil P. C. and cannot be made applicable to suits under Order 37. In other words Mr. Basu's contention is that the period of limitation under the old Limitation Act in respect of suits coming within the category of suits referred to under Order 37, of the Code has now been done away with and at present there being no other Art. in the Limitation Act specifically applicable to suits under Order 37, suits under Order 37 must now be taken to be covered by the ordinary period of limitation, viz., a period of three years. As I have said the point is of considerable novelty and although the Limitation Act was passed at the same time as the present Civil P. C. and although as far as I am aware it has never been suggested up to the present moment that the limitation in respect of suits under Order 37 of the Code is other than six months it is clearly incumbent upon me to examine Mr. Basu's contention having regard to the changes made in the Limitation Act.