KARRI RAMAYYA Vs. VILLOORI JAGANNADHAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The suit was brought for the partition of a bariki service inam, which was enfranchised in 1905 in the name of the 1st defendant. The contesting defendants were the purchasers from the 1st defendant and three of his sons by a sale-deed executed in 1906. The plaintiff was a purchaser from the 1st defendant s eldest son and two of his brothers in 1909. The brothers share in the joint family property being two-thirds and the 1st defendant s sons being 1/15th, the claim of the plaintiff was to recover 11/15th of the whole inam. He got a decree accordingly in the first Court which was confirmed in appeal. The first question now raised is whether the defendants, Nos. 2 and 3 had a saleable interest prior to enfranchisement. The short answer to this is that the sale through Exhibit B, having been executed on 21st September 1909 subsequent to the enfranchisement, passed all the rights which they then possessed. There was a previous agreement to sell in 1906, which does not affect the question. At that date Chellamma, the mother of defendants Nos. 1 to 3, was, it is suggested, alive. The Sub ordinate Judge found that she died five or six years ago, which comes to about 1906 or 1907. If she was alive at the time of the sale, it is argued that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had no right to convey the shares which were still in the holding of their mother. If the finding of the Subordinate Judge is correct, as we must assume it to be, Chellamma was certainly not alive at the date of the sale in 1909 But reliance is placed on Section 10 Clause 2, of Madras Act II of 1894, which runs as follows: "The succession to all hereditary village offices shall devolve on a single heir according to the general custom and rule of primogeniture governing succession to impartible zemindaris in Southern India" It is contended that this provision takes away the rights of any persons who claim any joint interest in the emoluments of the office. When the lands were enfranchised exclusively in the name of the 1st defend ant after he had succeeded to the lariki appointments as the daughter s son of the original male holder, it is contended that none of his brothers retained any interest therein.

(2.) We are clearly of opinion that the effect of enfranchisement is not to destroy the rights of any members of a joint family which has a hereditary interest in the inam. This question was fully considered in Gunnaiyan v. Kamakchi Ayyar 26 M. 339 and the conclusion arrived at was, that service inams which are enfranchised are impressed in the hands of the registered holder with the same character as if they had devolved upon him as ordinary property, independently of the hereditary office, and the registered owner will hold them as joint family property liable to partition. Section 10, Clause 2, of Madras Act II of 1894 in terms deals with the succession to village offices which it declares to be governed by the rule of primogeniture. There is nothing in the wording of the section to affect the family title to the lands which form the emoluments of the office, although in cases where the property gets into the hands of a stranger the Act contains provisions for its recovery. Such was the case dealt with in Venkata v. Rama 8 M. 249 9 Ind. Jur. 185. The subsequent decision in Gunnaiyan v. Kamakchi Ayyar 26 M. 339 places the rights of the members of a joint family claiming an interest to a hereditary village office on a sound footing. In the present case, the history of the dealings of this family with the lands to which the lower Courts have referred does not admit of any question being raised at this stage as to the hereditary nature of the inam and the mirasi rights which the family possessed in it. Nor can we consider what the rights of the parties would be if the family had been divided when the succession opened, as there was no evidence or admission of division and the point has not been taken in the memorandum of second appeal.

(3.) The next question that has been raised is whether property which descends on daughter s sons from their maternal grandfather is ancestral property in which the grandsons take an interest at birth according to the Mitakshara Law. If this question is answered in the negative, the 1st defendant s son, who is the 7th defendant, had no right to sell a 1/15th share to the contesting respondents and all that they can rightly claim is the two-thirds share of the 2nd and 3rd defendants. This question was definitely answered in the affirmative in Vythinatha Ayyar v. Yaggia Narayana Ayyar 27 M. 382 and the same question was answered in he negative in Jamna Prasad v. Ram Partap 29 A. 667 : 4 A.L.J. 582 : A.W.N. (1907) 211 and it is apparent from the notes to paragraph 275 in the 7th and 8th Editions of Mayne s Hindu Law and usage, that the learned author and editor eels doubts as to the correctness of the Madras decision. We have been asked to refer the matter to a Full Bench. But we do not consider that this case is of sufficient importance to warrant a reference, or that the state of the law is really in any uncertainty so far as this Court is concerned.