(1.) BOTH the lower Courts have held that the land which forms the subject of the suit was portion of a burial ground, actually used at some time as such. It is not denied by the appellants that it was so used till about 20 years ago. On the other hand, there is some evidence that I urials have taken place in the land until four or five years of the suit. On this finding the decree of the District Munsif (confirmed by the lower Appellate Court) was quite correct.
(2.) WE have had some difficulty in following the argument before us. Authorities were cited to show that in some eases land which has once been used as a burial ground may be utilised for other purposes. These authorities distinguish a graveyard from land which has been dedicated fora mosque: the latfer can never be used for any other purpose, whereas the former may, if it is no longer in use as a burial ground and if certain conditions (which need not be specified) are fulfilled. But those authorities can have no bearing on the question which is now sought to be argued before us. It is elementary law that if a piece of land is dedicated to one purpose, it cannot, contrary to the terms of the dedication and except in cases which fall under the ey- pres doctrine (or its equivalent in Muhammadan Law) be utilised for any other purpose. No attempt was made to bring the present case under any of the special rules or exceptions. The decree under appeal must stand and the appeal is dismissed with costs.