(1.) The objection taken before us is that the plaintiffs were not competent to sue on behalf of the temple under Clauses 16, 21 and 22 of Exhibit I, the award under which they hold the office of trustees of the temple. It is argued that these clauses entitle only a majority of the five trustees to sue. The clause relating to powers to sue is Clause 21, which empowers a suit to be brought even though some of the trustees are opposed to it, on the condition that the trustees unwilling to sue are made a party defendants. But Clause 21 refers to Clause 16 and it is argued that by implication, unless the requirements of Clause 16 are satisfied, a suit cannot be properly instituted. Assuming that this contention is correct, that Clause 16 applies to the institution of suits, we do not consider that its provisions are fatal to the present suit. Clause 16, in our opinion, provides that if the trustees are unanimous their acts will bind the temple; if the trustees are divided, then if the majority includes one of the senior muktessors the act of the majority will bind the temple; if, however, one or more of the trustees who do not form such a majority as is above referred to choose to do any act against the consent of the other trustees, they shall do so at their own risk as to costs.
(2.) present suit, therefore, cannot fail merely because it is not instituted by such a majority.
(3.) The next objection by the appellants is that in no case can a suit be validly instituted on behalf of the temple to which all the trustees are not parties (if not as plaintiffs then as defendants) and that unless there are five trustees, the temple cannot be properly represented. It is admitted that at the time of the institution of the suit there were only four trustees as parties to the suit. Since the appeal to this Court was filed, another trustee (the 4th respondent) has died and we have now only three trustees before us. We think that it would be most convenient and just in the circumstances of this case to allow the respondents three months time during which they may take steps to have two more trustees appointed and made parties to this appeal. Should the respondents get such trustees appointed and made parties and should the trustees so appointed and made parties consent to be bound by the proceedings leading up to this second appeal, some of the formal objections taken before us may not be material. We do not express any opinion upon the effect that the addition of the fresh parties may have on the result of the appeal, but take the course to which we have referred in order to meet the appellants objection that unless there are five trustees to represent the temple they cannot get a valid discharge.