DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER Vs. MATUKDHARI SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Matukdhari Singh and nine other persons were convicted by Babu Har Sahai Lal, Deputy Magistrate, 1st Class, of Gaya, under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. They appealed to the Sessions Judge of Gaya who allowed the appeals of all the ten persons. From that order of acquittal, the present appeal has been filed by the Local Government.

(2.) It is urged on behalf of the Local Government that the matter is one of considerable public importance, inasmuch as the accused in this case claimed to use force in asserting their rights of irrigation. It is argued that there would be considerable danger to the public peace if such action on behalf of private individuals was allowed to go unpunished. For the defence it is argued that an appeal from an acquittal stands on a different footing with regard to the consideration of evidence to an appeal from a conviction. Reference was made to the cases of Empress of India v. Gayadin 4 A. 148 and Emperor v. Madan Mondal 22 Ind. Cas. 731; 18 C.W.N. 668; 15 Cr. L.J. 155; 41 C. 662. These decisions were considered in Government Appeal No. 8 of 1914 by a Bench of which I was a member. It is sufficient for me here to say that no distinction is drawn in the Code of Criminal Procedure between an appeal froth an acquittal and an appeal from a conviction. It is expressly provided that an appeal from an acquittal may lie on a question of fact. Only one broad rule can be laid down with regard to the consideration of evidence in all criminal cases, and that is that the innocence of the accused person must be presumed; and the burden lies upon the prosecution of completely rebutting that presumption. If after the consideration of the whole evidence any doubt is felt by the Court as to the guilt of any accused person, he is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, and the verdict must be in his favour. There are, however, no special rules for dealing with the evidence in an appeal from an acquittal. Of course due weight must be given to the decision of the Court below and the reasons advanced for that decision. Apart from this, however, an appeal from an acquittal must be considered in precisely the same manner as all other cases are considered and it must be determined whether the evidence is such as to warrant a conviction of the accused.

(3.) This is an appeal from an Appellate order. There is a salutary rule which says that an Appellate Court should give weight to the opinion of the trying Court which had the witnesses before it and was, therefore, able to judge from their demeanour whether or not they were telling the truth. In an appeal like this from an acquittal passed upon appeal, this Court is obviously in as good a position as the lower Appellate Court to form an opinion with regard to the credibility of the witnesses. We must have, as the Appellate Court ought to have had, due regard to the opinion on this question formed by the trying Magistrate. The facts of this case are not seriously in dispute. There was undoubtedly an occurrence of the nature described by the witnesses in the early morning of Sunday, 4th October 1914. It arose inconsequence of the reluctance on the part of the people of Mauza Nimsar to allow the mauzas above them to take water from what is called the Nimsar Pyne. The Sessions Judge himself, who has acquitted the accused, says "The Nimsar people, as is admitted and proved beyond a shadow of doubt, demolished the dam at Sikaria claiming that their turn had come for the use of the water."