ROW VENKATA KUMARA MAHIPATI SURYA ROW BAHADUR GARU, SIRDAR RAJAMUNDRY CIRCAR AND RAJAH OF PITTAPUR Vs. GANI VENKAT SUBBA ROW; MADDIKONDA BUCHIRAJU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I think that Sadasivia Aiyar, J., was right in following the carefully considered judgment of Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ., in Ramakrishna Chetty v. Sub-ray a Iyer 18 Ind. Cas. 64 : 24 M.L.J. 54 (1913) M.W. N. 303 : 38 M. 101 and that the principle to be applied is that where an Act contains provisions for the limitation of suits which take away altogether a vested right of suit without providing any equivalent remedy, then according to the approved rule of construction, the provisions must he considered to have been enacted subject to the implied exception that they were not to extend to such vested rights of suit which were to continue subject to the rules of limitation in force at the passing of the Act. This rule of construction was adopted to give effect to the presumed intention of the Legislature not to take away vested rights in this fashion. It is recognised in Section 8 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891, and the provisions now in question must be taken to have been enacted with reference to it. In Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subraya Iyer 18 Ind. Cas. 64 : 24 M.L.J. 54 (1913) M.W. N. 303 : 38 M. 101 it was held with reference to this Act that the six years period applicable under Article 116 to a registered contract continued to apply to a suit for rent under the Madras Estates Land Act at a time when the period of limitation presented by it for suits of this nature had already expired. In the present case the claim for rent was not barred at the date of the passing of the Act, as it was kept alive under Section 7 of the Limitation Act owing to the minority of the plaintiff. Sections 210 and 211 enact rules of limitation for suits under the Act, and Section 211 expressly provides that Section 7 and certain other sections of the Limitation Act shall not apply to suits under this Act. Thus the result of the passing of the Act, which came into force two days after it received the Viceroy s assent, was to leave no opportunity for the exercise of the plaintiff s vested right of suit, unless the provisions of Section 211(1) be read subject to an implied exception in cases where these provisions would otherwise absolutely destroy the plaintiff s right of suit, which was in existence when the Act came into force. In addition to the cases cited in that judgment, I may refer to the recent decision of a Full Bench of five Judges of the Calcutta High Court, Gopeshwar Pal v. Jiban Chandra 24 Ind. Cas. 37 : 19 C.L.J. 549 at pp. 551, 560 (F.B.) : 18 C.W.N. 804 : 41 C. 1125 where Jenkins, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court after citing Commissioner of Public Works (Cape Colony) v. Logan (1903) A.C. 355 : 72 L.J. P. 91 : 88 L.T. 799 19 T.L.R. 545 and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) App. Cas. 369 : 74 L.J. P.C. 77 : 92 L.T. 738 : 21 T.L.R. 513 and Jackson v. Woolley 8 El. and Bl. 778 : 120 E.R. 289 : 27 L.J.Q.B. 448 : 4 Jur. (N.S) 658 : 6 W.R. 686 observed: Here the plaintiff at the time when the Amending Act was, passed had a vested right of suit, and we see nothing in the Act as amended that demands the construction that the plaintiff was there by deprived of a right of suit vested in him at the date of the passing of the Amending Act."

(2.) These observations are applicable to the present case and I think the appeals must be allowed, the decrees of the lower Courts be reversed, and the case remanded for disposal according to law. The respondents will pay the appellant s costs of the appeals. Other costs will abide and follow the event. Seshagiri Aiyar, J.

(3.) With the greatest reluctance, I have ventured to differ from the conclusion at which the learned Chief Justice has arrived.