(1.) What has to be determined in this case is the true construction of a document, dated 8th, March 1892, purporting on the face of it to be the Will of one Vaikunta Nadan. Many cases have been cited to us as, embodying the principles which should guide, the Court in construing such documents as the present, and I think the result of these may shortly be summarized as follows: We are to give effect to the intention of the testator as expressed in his words. We are to acquaint ourselves with the circumstances in which he was placed; we are to have regard to the habits of life and thought of the people to which he belonged and to the system of law under which he lived. But when all that is done, our task still remains to construe his language; and we cannot give effect to a supposed intention, however cogently suggested by extrinsic evidence, unless there are words to be found in the document which, on a natural construction, convey it either expressly or by necessary implication. Looking at this document, it is clear that there are no express words of testamentary gift to be found; words of gift, indeed, there are but they refer only to a gift of a joint estate with the testator, to be enjoyed during his life-time. Then it is said that the whole tenor of the document obviously contemplates that the plaintiff should deal with the properties as owner, after the decease of the testator. That is quite true; but is it solely referable to an estate created by a testamentary disposition? It obviously is not, because the testator shows, by the recitals in the document, that he believed himself to have adopted the plaintiff, though in fact he had not. The plaintiff could deal with the properties as effectively in his supposed capacity of adopted son, as in that of legatee; and it would only be possible to infer an unexpressed disposition from language which was solely referable to such a disposition. The last desperate suggestion of the appellant s Counsel, that the opening words of the document "Will in favour of Vaikunta Nadan" are to be taken as operative words of disposition of the testator s whole estate, to my mind puts a burden on the words that they are wholly incapable of bearing. It is said that the result of our construction is to defeat the testator s intention that the plaintiff should own his property after his death. If by that is meant the testator s intention as contained in this document, I do not agree; in my opinion he never intended the plaintiff to take his property as legatee under this document, or as a legatee at all. No doubt he had a general intention that the plaintiff should own his property, but he endeavoured to carry that out not by this document, but by what has proved to be an abortive adoption. The defeat of his general intention is due not to any construction laid down by this Court, but to his own failure to satisfy the legal requirements of a valid adoption.
(2.) As, in my view, this document contains no testamentary disposition at all, it is unnecessary to discuss the further question raised by the respondents, whether such disposition, if it existed, was subject to a condition precedent that a valid adoption should, in fact, have taken place. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.
(3.) This appeal arises out of a suit for the recovery of possession of certain properties, which belonged to one Vaikunta Nadan, from his heirs and their alienees. The plaintiff claims title as devisee under an instrument called a Will alleged to have been executed by Vaikunta Nadan on the 8th of March 1892, shortly before his death. The suit has been dismissed on the ground that the document of the 8th of March 1892 contained no dispositions of property, that if it did, they were not testamentary in character but took effect immediately on the execution of the instrument as a gift, and finally if here was a devise to the plaintiff the same was to him in his character as adopted son of Vaikunta Nadan. It is admitted that the plaintiff was not adopted by Vaikunta Nadan. No evidence has been taken in the case and except the matter of the construction of the document called the Will, no other question has been tried. The document is called a Will in several places and is addressed to the boy adopted by me whose name I have this day changed into Vaikunta Nadan from Tirugnanapal." There is, however, no question of identity and plaintiff is the Tirugananapal mentioned here. Vaikunta next refers to the position of his family (that they were nattamais and were held in veneration by his caste people) and states that he makes the Will according to the request of his castemen after consultation with his mother and wife for the purpose of perpetuating his family, for obtaining spiritual benefit by having a male child according to the Hindu Sastras and the enjoyment of his property. The next clause is important as that, if any, contains the devise of his properties to the plaintiff.