T SITHARAMA CHETTY Vs. SIR SSUBRAMANIA IYER, KCIE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are appeals from a, decree of the Subordinate Judge of Trichinopoly framing a scheme for the management of the temples at Srirangam. The case is one of great importance because this is admittedly the first time a scheme has been framed under what is now Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for a temple subject to a Temple Committee under Act XX of 1863, In the Lower Court all parties appear to have been willing that a scheme should be framed, but on appeal objection has been taken on behalf of the Committee to the scheme approved by the Court on the ground that it is not open to the Court to frame a scheme of this sort interfering with the statutory management of the Temple Committee. It will be convenient in the first place to consider the position of the Temple Committee under the Statute more especially as the Subordinate. Judge in approving of the introduction of a new governing body known as the Board of Control has been influenced by the fact that in his view the powers of the Temple Committee are of a very restricted character. Prior to Regulation VII of 1817 the British Government and the Hindu Rulers before, them had exercised powers of a visitatorial character over such foundations. See Rajah Muttu Ramalinga Setupati v. Periyanayagam Pillai (1874) L.R. 1 I.A. 209 at p. 232. Under that Regulation which was framed for the due appropriation of the rents and produce of lands granted for the support of Hindu Temples, etc., certain statutory powers and duties were conferred upon the Board of Revenue. Under Section 2 they were charged with a general superintendence of all endowments in land or money granted for the support of Hindu Temples Under Sections 3 and 5 a duty was imposed on them of seeing that the endowments are appropriated to the purposes for which they were granted and to the repairs of the buildings, and under Section 4 they were empowered to dispose of buildings which could not be repaired. Sections 7 to 11 provide for enquiries and reports to the Board by its local agents. Sections 11 to 14 are important. Under Section 11 the local agents are to report to the Board all vacancies in the office of trustees, managers or superintendents, whether these officers are hereditary or have been in the nomination of Government, and in the latter case to recommend fit and proper persons for the approval and confirmation of the Board. On the receipt of the report under Section 12, Section 13 requires the Board either to appoint the persons so nominated or "to make such other provision for the trust, management or superintendence as may seem to them right and fit with reference to the nature and conditions of the endowment" after obtaining any further information they may require. The Board actively exercised ail these powers until the year 1841 or 1842 when, in deference to strong objections Which were taken to this course by certain persons in England, the Board were ordered to withdraw as far as possible from the active management of Hindu Temples. No alteration however was made at the time in their statutory powers and duties under the Regulation and it was not until the passing of Act XX of 1863 that the situation was regularised and the powers exercised by the Board under the Regulation were transferred to Temple Committees constituted under that Act in the case of temples in which the nomination of the trustee, manager or superintendent thereof at the time of the passing of this Act (1863) was vested in or subject to the confirmation of Government. This is the effect of Section 3 and Sections 7 to 12 of the Act, Sections 4 to 6 dealing with cases in which the right of appointment was not vested in Government. Section 13 imposes upon all trustees, managers and superintendents the duty of keeping accounts and empowers and requires the Temple Committees to require the production of such accounts at least once a year. Lastly Sections 14 and 18 provide for the institution with the preliminary leave of the Court of suits by persons interested against trustees, managers or superintendents or members of the Temple Committees for any misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty, and empower the Courts to direct specific performance of any act and to award damages, and to remove the trustee, manager or superintendent. These sections do not empower the Court to frame a scheme for the management of the temple affairs, Karedla Vijayaraghava Perumalayya Naidu v. Vemavarapu Sitaramayya (1902) I.L.R. 26 M. 361.

(2.) It was in my opinion clearly the intention of the legislature that the extensive powers conferred on the Board of Revenue should be exercised thereafter by the Temple Committees and I think the Court should be very slow to construe the Act in such a manner as to impede the due exercise of these powers. I am therefore with great respect unable to agree with the decision in Santhalva v. Manjanna Shetty (1910) I.L.R. 34 M. 1., which was cited as showing the necessity for a scheme and which decides, if I rightly understand it, that the powers of the Committee are suspended by the occurrence of a vacancy among its members. No authority is cited in judgments in support of this view and the decision has been dissented from in Raghunandan Ramanuja Das v. Bibhuti Bhushan Mukerjee (1911) I.L.R. 39 C. 304, on the authority of an English case Doe v. Godwin (1822) 1 Dowl. and Ry. 259, which is directly in point. This also appears to me not to be in accordance with the principles laid down in Anantanarayana Ayyar v. Kuttalam Pillai (1899) I.L.R. 22 M. 481, as to the Committee being governed by the rules applicable to corporations. The term Committee, said Pollock, C.B. in Reynell v. Lewis (1846) 15 M. and W. 526, means "an individual or body to which others have delegated a particular duty," and I can see no reason why the remaining members constituting a majorty should not be able to act during a vacancy. In the absence of any decisive authority the other way the argument ab inconvenienti is in my opinion sufficient to show that such must have been the intention of the legislature.

(3.) Further with reference to the numerous decisions of this Court relating to the powers of the Committee to which Mr. Gangapathy Iyer has called our attention in the course of his exhaustive argument as showing the necessity for a scheme, I cannot help saying with great respect that some of these decisions appear to me to fetter the Committee unduly, and I think that the able judgment of Davies, J. in Seshadri Ayyangar v. Nataraja Ayyar (1898) I.L.R. 21 M. 179, with which Collins, C.J. agreed in the main and the recent decisions in Venkatachala Pillai v. The Taluq Board, Saidapet (1910) I.L.R. 34 M. 375, and Thiruvengadatha Aiyangar v. Ponnappa Aiyangar , are more in conformity with the terms of the Act and the intention of the legislature.