(1.) This appeal has been argued at considerable length but the main questions arising for determination may be shortly disposed of.
(2.) It was first contended that the appointment of the defendant Gopalaswami Naidu by three out of the five members constituting the committee of the Madura Meenakshi temple was absolutely null and void because it was not made at a meeting but by the votes of the three members given on papers sent in circulation.
(3.) We agree in the opinion that the committee as a body constituted under statutory authority should, in the absence of specific provisions in the statute, follow as far as practicable in the transaction of its business, the usual procedure adopted by public bodies entrusted with duties of a more or less public character. It would follow therefore that the committee should ordinarily transact its more important business at a meeting held after due notice to the members and it would specially be incumbent upon it to do so, if any member so required. In the event of such a member's request not being complied with it would be open to him to challenge the propriety of any action taken by the committee in disregard of his requisition and if necessary, by legal proceedings to restrain the other members of the committee from giving effect to their decisions. But We are unable to accept the contention that the transaction otherwise than at a meeting even of such important business as the appointment of a manager is necessarily void and incapable of being adopted and approved of by the other members who may not at first have agreed to it. There is nothing in the Religious Endowments Act (Act XX of 1863) which compels us to adopt such an extreme view nor does the decision in Thandavaraya Pillai V/s. Subbayyer I.L.R. 23 M. 483 on which much stress was laid by the appellant really support the contention. The fact that the dismissal of the trustee was not resolved on at a meeting is, no doubt, relied on in that case as one of the grounds of the decision but other grounds even more material are also given. We do not think that we should look upon the committee strictly as a corporation so as to import into the consideration of cases like the present, the technical rules applicable to such bodies in England, nor can the English precedents to which our attention has been drawn be treated as direct authorities especially as they in most cases depend upon the particular constitution of the bodies concerned, their previous course of conducting business and similar considerations. Even if we do look to English precedents the cases reported in Router V/s. Electric Telegraph Company 26. L.J. Q.B. 46. Browning V/s. The Great Central Mining Company 29.L.J., Ex.399 and In Re Great Northern Salt and Chemical works, Ex parte Kennedy 44, Ch. D. 472, so far as they go would rather support the view we have stated. No doubt the two former cases relate to delegated authority but the third relates to the action of the corporate body itself. In this view it is necessary to consider whether the finding of the Subordinate Judge is right to the effect that the two members of the committee who at first did not join in the order of appointment but in fact protested against it, afterwards acccepted it and acted accordingly. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the Subordinate Judge the evidence on the point being overwhelming. In repeated communications from members of the Committee including the originally dissentient members the defendant was referred to in express terms as the manager actually exercising the duties of the office and instructions were given to him in reference to the performance of those functions without any hint that he was not recognised as properly appointed. For instance in the original order appointing him he was required to furnish security within two months. When the first security bond submitted by him was disapproved, three members of the committee including the two originally dissentient members extended the time more than once. What is still more decisive is the course adopted by the committee in removing the defendant from office. Formal charges were drawn up against him, explanation was obtained and upon consideration thereof he was first suspended and finally his dismissal was ordered. This is a clear indication that the originally dissentient members had accepted him as the manager.