KULADA KINKAR ROY Vs. DANESH MIR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a Rule issued by this Court under Section 15 of the Charter Act upon an application made by the petitioner, who was the first party to a proceeding under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, calling upon the District Magistrate of Faridpore to show cause why an order under Section 146 of the Code should not be set aside. It appears that on the 2nd October 1904 the Sub-Inspector of Police of Shibchur submitted a report to the Deputy Magistrate of Madaripur that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed concerning a large tract of newly-formed chur land lying within his jurisdiction. On the 7 October the Magistrate drew up a proceeding under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and as the case appeared to him to be one of emergency, he also directed the attachment of the subject-matter of dispute pending his decision under the section. The procedure laid down in the section was followed, and after a full inquiry into the question of possession of the respective claimants, on the 31 March 1905, the Deputy Magistrate made an order for attachment under Section 146, as none of the parties was in his opinion in undisputed possession of the chur. We are now invited to set aside this order, the validity of which is challenged on three grounds, namely, first that the initial order recorded by the Deputy Magistrate does not embody a statement of the grounds upon which he was satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed; secondly, that the Police Report upon which the Deputy Magistrate founded the initial order does not disclose any sufficient reason for the initiation of proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and thirdly, that the Deputy Magistrate has failed to give effect to a previous order relating to the same property under Section 530 of Act X of 1872, and a decree of a Civil Court, which decided the question of title in favour of the present petitioner. In our opinion none of these contentions can be successfully maintained, and no ground has been established to justify the interference of this Court.

(2.) As regards the first point taken on behalf of the petitioner, it is sufficient to refer to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Khosh Mahomed Sircar v Nazir Mahomed (1905) 9 C.W.N. 1065, which shows that a reference by a Magistrate in the initial order to the Police Report, which clearly sets out the likelihood of a breach of the peace, is a sufficient statement of the reasons of his being satisfied of the existence of a dispute likely to cause such breach of the peace. The first ground, therefore, fails and must be over-ruled.

(3.) The second ground upon which the validity of the final order is attacked, namely, that the Police Report upon which the initial order was based does not disclose any sufficient reason for the initiation of the proceedings, resolves itself into two branches. It is argued, in the first place, that the Police Report does not set out any facts from which the inference could be legitimately drawn that there was any likelihood of a breach of the peace at the time when the initial order was made, that consequently the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings, and that a finding arrived at in the course of the trial could not cure this defect and confer upon him a jurisdiction which he did not possess. It is argued, in the second place, that in any event the Police Report does not show that a breach of the peace was imminent, and that, accordingly, there was no foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction which the Magistrate assumed. In support of the first branch of the contention, reliance is placed upon the cases of Rajah Run Bahadoor V/s. Ranee Tikssuree Koer (1874) 22 W.R. Cr. 79, Puddomonee Dassee V/s. Juggodumba Dassee (1875) 25 W.R. Cr. 2, Gobind Chunder Moitra v. Abdool Sayad (1881) I.L.R. 6 Calc. 835, Dhanput Singh V/s. Chatterput Singh (1893) I.L.R. 20 Calc. 513 and Anesh Mollah V/s. Ejaharuddi (1901) I.L.R. 28 Calc. 446. In support of the second branch of the contention, reliance is placed upon the cases of In the matter of Kunund Naraiu Bhoop (1878) I.L.R. 4 Calc. 650, Uma Churn Santra V/s. Beni Madhub Roy (1880) 7 C.L.R. 352, Gobind Chunder Moitra V/s. Abdool Sayad (1881) I.L.R. 6 Calc. 835, Damodur Biddyadhur Mohapatro V/s. Syamanund Dey (1881) I.L.R. 7 Calc. 385, Kali Kissen Tagore V/s. Anund Chunder Roy (1896) I.L.R. 23 Calc. 557, and Janu Manjhi V/s. Mani-ruddin (1904) 8 C.W.N. 590. It is further contended that, if the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction, the petitioner is entitled, as a matter of right, to ask the interference of this Court, and reference is made to the cases of Sheikh Munglo V/s. Durga Narain Nag (1876) 25 W.R. Cr. 74, 76, Chunder Madhub Ghose v. Juggut Chunder Sen (1879) 4 C.L.R. 483, Queen-Empress V/s. Gobind Chandra Das (1893) I.L.R. 20 Calc. 520, and Kali Kissen Tagore V/s. Anund Chunder Roy (1896) I.L.R. 23 Calc. 557.