BALWANT SINGH Vs. RAM CHARAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal has been filed by one Chaudhri Balwant Singh who had filed an application under Section 33, Arbitration Act, Act 10of 1940, challenging the validity of an award. On 8 March 1941 the parties referred certain disputes to one Kunwar Sardar Singh arbitrator. On 30 April 1941 the arbitrator delivered a copy of the award to each of the parties. On 22 May, 1941 the arbitrator registered this award. On 23 May 1941 the appellant Ch. Balwant Singh filed an objection under Section 33 of the Act and his grounds were that the award registered on 22 May, 1941 was materially different from the award dated 30th April 1941. He further urged that the award was written out on a stamp paper on 22 May, and was invalid and certain other objections were taken which it is not necessary to set out here. The Court dismissed the application under Section 33 of the Act on 25 September 1941. It is against the order dismissing the application that this appeal has been filed. The learned Counsel for the appellant has frankly admitted that he cannot challenge the findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge on the points that had been raised before him. He wants, however, to raise before us a new point that certain matters not referred to arbitration had been dealt with by the arbitrator and certain other matters which were in the agreement for reference had not been dealt with. The question whether certain matters not referred to arbitration were decided by the arbitrators and why, is purely a question of fact and the point not having been raised in the Court below we do not consider it proper to allow the point to be raised here now. There is, therefore, no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. The respondent has, however, filed a cross-objection and his contention is that the learned Judge of the Court below having dismissed the application under Section 33 of the Act he was bound under Section 17 of the same Act to pronounce judgment according to the award and he, therefore, urges that that judgment should now be pronounced in accordance with the award and a decree shall follow. The learned Counsel for the appellant opposes the cross-objection and his contention is that an application under Section 33 of the Act is entirely a separate proceeding and the Court below having rejected his application the order was entirely in favour of the respondent and he cannot under the Code file any cross-objection.

(2.) WE have carefully considered the various sections-of the Arbitration Act. The Act is divided into various Chapters and Chap. 2 deals with arbitration without intervention of a Court. When an award is pronounced outside Court Section 14, Clause (2) provides that the arbitrators shall at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or if so directed by the Court cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them to be filed in Court. Art. 178, Limitation Act, provides six months limitation for an application for the filing of an award made in any matter referred to arbitration without the intervention of a Court and this period commences from the date of the award. When an award has been so filed under Section 14, Clause (2), Arbitration Act, the Court is required to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award, and Art. 158, Limitation Act, provides that the parties should file applications to set aside an award within ten days of the receipt of the notice of the filing of the award. Secs.15 and 16, Arbitration Act, then deal with the power of the Court to modify an award or to remit the same for reconsideration. Section 17 of the Act then provides that in case the Court sees no cause to remit the award or to set it aside the Court shall "after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award...." Mr. Pathak on behalf of the respondent urges that the words "after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired or such application having been made after refusing it" refer to an application under Section 33 of the Act, and he says that Section 33 is in Chap. 5 - General Chapter - and therefore applies equally to Chaps. 2, 3 and 4, and he, therefore, says that even if a party has not applied under Section 14, since the other party came into Court under Section 33 and his application was dismissed, the Court was bound to pronounce its judgment according to the award. It may be mentioned here that there is no period of limitation fixed in the Arbitration Act for an application under Section 17, but it is agreed that Art. 91, Limitation Act will be applicable which gives a period of three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside become known to him. Having carefully considered the various sections of the Act and the scheme of the Act we are of opinion that Secs.14, 15, 16 and 17 must be read together. If a party has filed an application under Section 33, Arbitration Act challenging the existence or validity of an award we do not think that the procedure laid down in Secs.14, 15 and 16 of the Act is made immediately applicable. To our mind, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the proceedings under Section 33 are entirely different from the proceedings under Secs.14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Act is sound and the lower Court was not bound to pronounce a judgment in accordance with the award merely because it was dismissing the application under Section 33 filed by the other side, specially when it had not been moved to pass any such order by the respondent. To our mind, Section 33, Arbitration Act, was enacted to provide a speedy remedy to a party objecting to a reference or an award, and instead of having to file a separate suit for the purpose he can now merely move an application which has to be generally decided on affidavits. WE are, therefore, of opinion that the cross- objection must also fail and we dismiss it with costs.