BISHRAM BAHORIK SATNAMI Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE applicant has been convicted of rape and his appeal has been dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur. I am asked to interfere in revision on the ground that the evidence of Sukhin, a child of 10, is not corroborated. Sukhin was on her way from Neora where she lives to Chumkawa and on 19th November 1942 in the vicinity of the village of Amtara was accosted by a man in broad daylight who raped her. Shortly after he incident she was seen weeping by Mt. Butri P.W. 3. As soon as she got to her sister's house at Chumkawa she informed her sister. The latter (Mt. Patin, P.W. 2) says that ber dhoti was full of blood and that her back had bruises and that Sukhin described the assailant as fair and short-statured with a stick, bracelets and a ring. Mt. Patin at once informed Gajanand and Gajanand questioned the girl who repeated her story and also gave a description of the culprit. The kotwar also went to Gajanand. He also noticed her clothes full of blood and as Sukhin could not walk took the report written by Gajanand the next morning. The report reached the police station 7 miles away at 3 P.M. on the 20th. The girl was medically examined on the 22nd. There was redness found in the vaginal opening, there was a little white discharge on the labia majora, and the hymen was ruptured. Sukhin was able to identify the accused as her assailant in a parade held on 23rd November 1942 at Amtara village where the accused resides. There is direct evidence that the accused was in a field at Amtara shortly before the crime; (vide Paltudas) which, if believed, entirely destroys the alibi set up in the defence evidence.

(2.) IT is obvious that the story of rape is amply corroborated, and I do not consider that the law requires that there should be independent corroboration in the case of rape of a child aged ten as to the identify of the culprit. I have nothing to add to the exposition of law given by Pollock J. in P.F. Conroy v. Emperor and would point out that the position is very different where a woman makes an accusation of rape and where a child says that a particular person is a culprit. In the latter case I fail to see any distinction between a case of robbery by a stranger or of rape by a stranger. In both cases one is thrown back on the question whether the evidence of the child can be accepted as to the identity of the culprit and the fact that the case is a rape case introduces no different element unless one is going to attribute to a child of 10 the possible existence of motives to choose a particular person as a culprit which might come into play in the case of a woman. The learned advocate for the applicant relies on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Nur Ahmed where it is generally stated that there must be the type of corroboration described in Rex v. Baskerville (1916) 12 Cr. A.R 81. This would mean corroboration as to the identity of the accused. But it is obvious that the Court was considering the matter generally in relation to a charge brought by a woman against a man. In the case Bhola Nath v. Emoperor 43 C.W.N. 1180 the Calcutta High Court which does not allow evidence of identification before the police to be given naturally did not regard the evidence of identification as corroborative evidence regarding the identity of the accused, and it is clear that the 'High Court required corroboration regarding the identity of the accused for the reason that it was a sexual offence. But again that was a case where the complainant was a grown woman. Kinkhede A.J.C. in Soosalal Baania v. Emperor A.I.R. 1925 Nag. 74 emphasised that when the victim of an offence of rape is an innocent girl of tender age her evidence carries great weight. In that case the assailant lived in the same village and was already known to the girl. In this case the assailant was a stranger and although Gajanand (p.W. 4) says that he knows the accused and indeed testifies to his good character, nevertheless the fact that the identity of the assailant was not known and that the description was given by Mt. Sukhin herself before his identity was traced effectually precludes the existence of any possible motive for false incrimination. It is the existence of possible motives for false incrimination which might attract the necessity for corroboration and where no such motives can even be suggested it cannot be said that there is any rule of law or of prudence which makes independent corroboration necessary as to the culprit's identity.