JANARDAN EKNATH Vs. GANESH SADASHIV

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On the hearing of Second Appeal No. 549 of 1941 Mr. Justice Lokur and Mr. Justice Rajadhyaksha having found a conflict of authorities about the interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, read with Section 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act, 1879, referred the following question for the decision of a full bench: Having regard to Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, is the plaintiff in a suit governed by Section 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act for the purpose of limitation entitled to the benefit of Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act?

(2.) The short facts leading to this appeal are as follows. On March 6, 1929, the original three defendants passed a promissory note for Rs. 1,200 in favour of the plaintiff. On August 11, 1932, defendant No. 1 wrote a letter to the plaintiff which was contended to be an acknowledgment of the liability under the promissory note. Relying on that letter, the plaintiff filed the suit on June 2, 1938, against all the three defendants. The common defence of all the defendants was that the letter in question did not amount to an acknowledgment. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 further contended that they were not bound by the letter, because they had separated from defendant No. 1. There was also a dispute about the consideration. At the hearing the trial Court found against the plaintiff on the question of separation of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. It also found that the letter in question did not amount to an acknowledgment and therefore dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed. He did not contest the finding of the trial Court in respect of defendants Nos. 2 and 3, but contended that the letter amounted to an acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act and defendant No. 1 was therefore liable on the promissory note. The first Appeal Court rejected that contention and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff filed a second appeal. In the interval two decisions of this Court were pronounced. The first was by Mr. Justice Divatia, sitting as a single Judge, in Keshav Krishna V/s. Bhagwan Sambhu (1941) 44 Bom. L.R. 138. That was in respect of the application of Section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act in the case of a suit covered by Section 3, Clause (w), of the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act. The learned Judge held that the amended provisions of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act prevented the plaintiff from relying on Section 20 of the Act. Some time later Mr. Justice N.J. Wadia and Mr. Justice Sen in Kishorelal Stores V/s. Jagannath Bayaji (1943) 45 Bom. L.R. 1064 took a contrary view and differed from the view of Mr. Justice Divatia. The referring judgment mentions both these cases which have given rise to this reference.

(3.) It was argued before us by Mr. Gajendragadkar that Section 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act did not prescribe a period of limitation, because if a local Act prescribed a period, it must mention a starting point. He further contended that the words used in Section 72, particularly the word "substituted", showed that the Legislature amended the schedule of the Indian Limitation Act but did not prescribe a different period by Section 72. From those arguments it was contended that Section 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act was not a special or local law which prescribed a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act and, therefore, Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act did not apply. He frankly conceded that if on a proper construction of Section 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act the Court came to the conclusion that it prescribed a different period of limitation, his contentions must fail. It is, therefore, necessary to consider those two arguments as advanced.