T SAROJINI DEVI Vs. TSRI KRISTNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two connected appeals have been brought from a preliminary decree in a partition suit. One Ramachandra Rao died on 23 February 1939, leaving him surviving his widow (plaintiff), two sons (defendants 1 and 2) and an unmarried daughter by his predeceased wife (defendant 3) and his mother (defendant 6). The sons and daughter being minors were represented by their maternal grandfather defendant 4 who was appointed as their guardian for the suit. Defendant 5 was a stranger with whom Ramachandra Rao carried on business in partnership as retailer of fancy goods under the style of Friends & Co. Soon after the death of Ramachandra Rao there were magisterial proceedings and inventories were prepared of the moveables in the house including the articles belonging to Friends & Co., which had its shop in the front rooms of the same premises. The plaintiff sued for partition and delivery of a third share of Ramachandra Rao's properties which were set out in five schedules annexed to the plaint. As Ramachandra Rao died undivided from his sons, the plaintiffs right to a share could only be based on the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and though the claim was originally made in respect of all the properties it Was conceded that she was not entitled to a share in the agricultural lands forming part of the estate, as it has since been held by the Federal Court that the Act does not operate to regulate succession to agricultural land in the Governor's Provinces but operates only in respect of other kinds of property: see In Re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act ( 41) 28 A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 72. In the absence of parallel legislation by the Legislature of this province in regard to agricultural land this decision has given rise to new problems in apportioning or allocating, among the full and partial cosharers, the common obligations to be borne by the estate as a whole, such as claims of creditors, maintenance holders, and unmarried daughters, and some of those problems arise for consideration in the present case. The first contention raised by Mr. Raghava Rao for the plaintiff relates to a mango- grove (item 36, Schedule A) forming part of the estate. The Court below negatived the plaintiff's claim to a share therein on the ground that it is agricultural land succession to which is not regulated by the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. While it has been held in the decision already referred to that succession to agricultural land is a subject within the exclusive competence of the Provincial Legislature, there is no indication in the judgment as to what is agricultural land within the meaning of entries No. 21 of List 2 and No. 7 of List 3 of Schedule 7, Government of India Act, 1935. No case throwing light on the point has been brought to our notice though numerous decisions were cited as to the connotation of the term "agricultural" or "agriculture" occurring in various other enactments relating, for the most part, to tenancy legislation in this and other provinces. Many of these statutes contain their own definitions of the term and even where there is no definition the term had to be interpreted in the light of the object and general policy underlying the particular enactment and of other indications afforded by it. It seems to us, therefore, not profitable to discuss in detail any of those decisions as they cannot afford any useful guidance in the interpretation of the expression "agricultural land" in the Constitution Act. That Act has not defined the term which has accordingly to be interpreted in its ordinary sense controlled, no doubt, by the context of the Act.

(2.) It is somewhat remarkable that a word in such common use as "agriculture" should have given rise to a. great divergence of judicial opinion in regard to its interpretation. (His Lordship then referred and explained the decisions reported in Murugeaa V/s. Chinnathambi ( 01) 24 Mad. 421, Rajah of Venkatagiri V/s. Ayyappa ( 15) 2 A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 781, Pavadai V/s. Ramasami ( 22) 9 A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 351 and Chandrasekhara V/s. Doriaswami ( 31) 18 A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 659 and proceeded.) It is unnecessary to refer to the decisions of the other High Courts as those to which reference has been made sufficiently illustrate the difficulty in defining the term which admits of different interpretations. Mr. Raghava Rao however claimed that the decision of the Privy Council in Keshe Prasad V/s. Sheo Pargash ( 24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 247, practically concluded the point in his favour, as it related more or less to the same kind of property as we are now considering, viz., grove land. It was a pronouncement on appeal from the decision in Kesho Prasad V/s. Sheo Pargash ( 22) 9 A.I.R. 1922 All. 301, where, following a line of cases decided by that Court, it was held that land granted by a zamindar "for the purpose of planting a grove the grantee agreeing to deliver one-half of the fruit to the zamindar" was not "land held for agricultural purposes" within the meaning of the Agra Tenancy Act. It would however appear that the earlier decisions in that province were based on the peculiar status of "grove-holders pure and simple" who had no rights in the land after the trees were cut. Their Lordships simply expressed their agreement with the opinion of the High Court that "it is impossible to hold that that section (S. 79) has any application whatever to such a property as the grove in fact is." There is no discussion as to the connotation of the term "agriculture," and no test of any general application is indicated. We cannot therefore regard the decision as a conclusive authority on the question we have to decide in this case. As we have already pointed out, the term "agriculture" is used in different senses and in order to ascertain in what sense it is used in the Legislative Lists in Schedule 7, Constitution Act, we must have regard to the object and purpose of Section 100 of which these Lists really form part. That section deals with the distribution of legislative powers as between the Federal and Provincial Legislatures, and the Lists enumerate the "matters" in respect of which those Legislatures have or have not power to make laws. In such context it seems to us that the expression "agricultural land" must receive the widest meaning for it would be somewhat grotesque to suppose that Parliament intended that lands devoted to the production of one kind of crop should devolve according to laws passed by Provincial Legislatures, while those used for growing another kind should pass according to laws made by the Central Legislature, or that "the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on" (per Reilly J. in Chandrasekhara V/s. Doriaswami ( 31) 18 A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 659) should determine the law which governs the devolution of the land. Nor could it have been intended that succession to such lands should depend on the degree of tillage or preparation of the soil or of the skill and labour expended in rearing and maintaining the plants. We are of opinion that for the purposes of the relevant entries in Lists II and III of Schedule 7, the expression "agricultural lands" must be taken to include lands which are used or are capable of being used for raising any valuable plants or trees or for any other purpose of husbandry. It follows that the mango grove in question is agricultural land in respect of which the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, does not operate to regulate succession.

(3.) The only other items of Schedule A as to which the plaintiff raised any objection before us are 31 and 32, a house and a site, which defendant 4, who was managing the properties on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 as their guardian, sold for Rs. 1750 during the pendency of the suit. It was objected that the sale was for a low value and could not bind the plaintiff, but the lower Court has observed that neither the sale nor the price was questioned, and it has decreed to the plaintiff her share of the sale proceeds. The objection cannot therefore be entertained at this stage. (The plaintiff's contention that she should have been given a third share of the moveables which bear the initials of Subba Rao, was accepted and the plaintiff's claim to a share in item 318 of Schedule B-l also succeeded.) (And as regards the jewels and gold and silver articles comprised in Schedules B and B-l, his Lordship held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any share in the jewels claimed by defendants 6 and 3 respectively in para. 17 (a) and (b) of their written statement.) These paragraphs, however, include not merely items of jewels, but also other items which are gold and silver vessels. It seems to us that the plaintiff's claim to a share in these articles stands on a different footing. While it may well be presumed that the jewels found in the possession of a family belong to one or other of the ladies of the family as stridhanam property in the absence of any clear evidence that they are family jewels, no such presumption can safely be made in respect of the gold and silver vessels and articles in the possession of the family. As regards these moveables we consider that they must be treated as belonging to the family unless there is clear evidence that they belong to one or other of the ladies of the family and the plaintiff must be allowed a share in these items. The evidence will have to be examined from this standpoint.