(1.) This is a reference under Section 5, Court-fees Act. The facts of the case are that the plaintiffs, claiming to be reversioners sued for a declaration that a sale made by defendant 3, a Hindu widow, in favour of defendants 1 and 2, was not binding upon the reversionary interest. The reliefs asked for in the plaint were (1) On adjudication of the above points the Court may be pleased to decide defendant 3 had and has only life interest in respect of the lands in suit and that these plaintiffs are the next reversioners of Bandhu Singh aforesaid; (2) the Court may, on adjudication of relief No. 1 be pleased to declare that the loan taken under the sale deed dated 23-3- 36 executed by defendant 3 in favour of defendants 1 and 2 in respect of the lands specified herein below was unnecessary and illegal and as such the sale deed is void, illegal and inoperative as against the plaintiffs, who neither are nor can be bound thereby.
(2.) There is also the usual prayer for any other reliefs, but that is not material. The plaint was stamped with a court-fee of Rs. 15 for a declaration merely, under Art. 17(3) of Schedule 2, Court-fees Act. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court on the finding that the plaintiffs were not reversioners, and had no status entitling them to sue. The plaintiffs appealed, paying again a court-fee of Rs. 15 and the appellate Court decreed the suit, and gave the plaintiffs a declaration in these terms: It will be declared that the sale deed (Ex. 1), dated 23 March 1986, executed by Mt. Piaree Kuer in favour of Chowdhury Viswanath Singh and Chowdhury Sarjoo Singh, defendants 1 and 2, will not be binding on the plaintiffs reversioners.
(3.) Defendants 1 and 2 then preferred the present second appeal. The Stamp Reporter took the view that the suit was one for declaration and consequential relief, inasmuch as a declaration was first sought for that the plaintiffs were reversioners, and the second relief flowing therefrom was the consequential relief that the alienation by the widow was not valid and binding on the reversioners after her death, and ad valorem court-fees under Section 7(iv)(c) were, therefore, payable upon the plaint, memorandum of first appeal and memorandum of second appeal, and there was a deficit for each. The learned Taxing Officer, considering the question of general importance has referred the case to me as Taxing Judge.