(1.) Originally six persons were accused in this case of whom the first four are now the appellants. The first accused was charged with culpable homicide not amounting to murder and all the accused were charged with rioting armed with deadly weapons and with culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted accused 5 and 6 holding that there was no unlawful assembly of five or more persons and finding that there was no rioting. The first accused was convicted of the main charge under Section 304, Indian Penal Code, and accused 2, 3 and 4 were convicted under Section 304 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code.
(2.) It is contended for appellants 2, 3 and 4 that their conviction under Section 304 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, is illegal, the contention being that they were charged with a constructive offence and have bean found guilty of a substantive offence and the decision of Jackson, J., in Rami Reddi, In re 1931 Mad. 240 as to the illegality of a conviction in such circumstances for a substantive offence has been quoted. But this decision does not apply because, in my view, the conviction under Section 34, Indian Penal Code, does not imply that each of the persons convicted there under has been guilty of a substantive offence. This has been brought out in Bhondu Daa V/s. Emperor 1929 Pat. 11 with reference to the judgment of Lord Sumner in Barendra Kumar V/s. Emperor 1925 P.C. 1. Conversely we have it in Theethumalai Gounder V/s. Emperor 1925 Mad. 1 that when a person is charged with being a member of an unlawful assembly one of the members of which caused grievous hurt in pursuance of the common object, there is no necessary implication that that particular member is not himself. The charge in this case with reference to Section 304 and 149 runs that: at the same time and place, and in course of the same transaction, while you all were members of the aforesaid unlawful assembly, one or more of you severely beat the said Palani Boyan in prosecution of the aforesaid common object.
(3.) The very charge suggests that one or more of the accused persons took an active part though it has not specified. which of the accused did so. It has been held in Emperor v. Ranchhod Seersang 1924 Bom. 502 that when a charge is made of an offence with reference to Section 149 it will not be illegal to convict the accused of that offence read with Section 34 if no prejudice is occasioned to the accused persons in their defence. I cannot see that any prejudice in this case was caused to the appellants in their defence. The charge has made it perfectly clear what case it was they had to meet. It plainly set out that they were associated together with a common intention to cause hurt. As to what they did in pursuance of the common intention is a point to which I shall come later. I shall first however deal with the point that has been taken as to the facts with reference to the convictions of appellants 2 and 3. It has been argued that there is some doubt as to the guilt of these two appellants with reference to certain statements made to the police by P.Ws. 7 and 9. P.W. 7 stated that immediately after accused 1 beat the deceased, accused 2 to 6 also came there and that accused 4 gave the deceased a blow with a lathi and the witness ran away and did not know what transpired after-wards. P.W. 9 stated that accused 2 and 4 also beat him and that she did not Bee others beating but they were also standing there. I do not see anything in either of these statements to show that accused 2 and 3 did not, according to these witnesses, take part in the beating.